4 ms·
I think "drastically different" is probably overstating the truth. It certainly doesn't jibe with anything I've read. It's worth bearing in mind that, from wha
by VBprogrammer 8y ago
I think "drastically different" is probably overstating the truth. It certainly doesn't jibe with anything I've read.
It's worth bearing in mind that, from what we know, neither of the two crashes had anything to do with handling difficulties in the new aircraft near the stall.
- salawat 8y agoI say drastically different because no one pays the complexity tax of increased automation to deal with something that isn't important. In this case, to the certifiability of the airframe. I understand your caution against overstating things, but I'm not trying to be hyperbolic. If you think about the consequences of doing basic maneuvers in adverse conditions (weather/load/engine power conditions), you rapidly begin to get into areas where what seems minor would get into uncharted territory without a working MCAS. It is a different plane in terms of manual flying. The automation non-withstanding.
- VBprogrammer 8y agoI get where you are coming from, and it's true that "the FARs are written in blood" but I'm not convinced that a non-linear stick force would have caused any real world issues. For a start, all of the critical phases of flight (takeoff, landing and go-around) usually involve some amount of flaps, for which MCAS is apparently unnecessary.
- salawat 8y agoI'd like to point you here, https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19527543 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19527543 This is an interview with D.P. Davies, a test pilot of the Aviation Review Board of the UK. He faced many of the same arguments back in the 1950's with regards to the certifiability of the 707-300 I believe, but nevertheless rejected it for non compliance. In that case, even if the plane stalled itself, it would immediately pitch back down, making it a "benign" aberrant flight characteristic. However, as he successfully argued, certifying that plane as is would set a precedent Which would deteriorate the overall airworthyness of airframes over time as the goal posts were allowed to slip further and further away from what was required by law. We call this Normalization of Deviance, and it's an Engineering firms favorite way to get people killed in high profile ways. I am far from the best example of a person who doesn't exceed the boundaries of "rules" when they keep me from getting something done, but once you have the thing done in a non-compliant way, it is absolutely imperative to bring it back into compliance somehow or ensure every stakeholder (regulator/customer/user alike) is aware of the exceptionality of the non-compliant piece, and owning it in whatever capacity is required to get the job done safely. Creators, designers, manufacturers, etc are given a great deal of leeway when it comes to doing things; part of that is the expectation that you know the rules you are breaking, and you are making the best effort to either communicate or remedy the non-compliance. Don't know as it will change your mind, but I hope it makes where I'm coming from clearer.