4 ms·

You can construct a client such that the server IS outside of the scope. You can determine if a client has such a property from the client alone. I would only w

by zeeboo 8y ago

You can construct a client such that the server IS outside of the scope. You can determine if a client has such a property from the client alone. I would only want to use a client such that the server is outside of the scope. It's strictly better if the client has this property even if the server is open and magically trusted to be running the code you expect. The keybase client is such a client. If it isn't please inform someone with details on why. edit: Do you audit all of the software running on all of the routers between you and keybase's servers? Why or why not? If not, why does this reasoning not extend to the servers? Why would the routers not part of the whole system, top to bottom?

josh2600 8y ago
It would be great to audit all of the software running on all of the routers I use. I hope that we someday move to a model where all routers run open-source attestable software. Let me phrase this another way: if there's nothing to hide on the server, why isn't it open source? We can go back and forth on this forever. My position is simple: strictly speaking, it's more rational to trust open source software. Trusting closed source software ultimately boils down to "trust me". I would love to reduce the degrees to which we have to blindly trust the systems we use.
- zeeboo 8y ago
  And yet, all of the routers are not audited, and I presume you believe in the security of some applications that use them. In other words, the trusted base of the system does not depend on all of the components in the system (you start with the assumption that any closed components are hostile). The keybase servers are exactly the same. The answer is that they do have things to hide: anti-spam/anti-scam systems, for example. The question is if they are hiding something that matters for security. You can determine this by auditing only the client. Sure, open source software is great, and has many uses. In this case, it has no use in ensuring that keybase is secure. Somehow, you don't have to trust a great many components in the secure software you use on a daily basis, and yet you have to trust keybase's servers because.. reasons? And somehow this trust is important even though you'd still be blindly trusting that they're running what you hope. I won't argue that some people would benefit from the server being open source, but to argue that open sourcing it has anything to do with security is just inane and FUD.
  - josh2600 8y ago
    The question boils down to "what can an attacker learn by owning the server" and right now you don't know. You can pretend that doesn't matter, but it's not inane or FUD. You have to model the whole system to understand the threat model. Anything less is blind trust.
    - zeeboo 8y ago
      You can know exactly what the attacker can learn because you can see ALL of the information that your client passes to the server by auditing ONLY the client. Your argument applies equally well to every single router or middle box on the internet, and it's just as wrong there. You prove that it doesn't matter by assuming that keybase is running the most malicious code possible, auditing your client, and deciding that the system is still secure. This is what auditing the client means. Additionally, to bring up this fact again because it has only been hand-waved away: Even if the server was open source, there is no guarantee they are running that code. Thus, there is no benefit to security until systems exist (somehow?) to prove the server is running the code you expect. Double additionally: even IF you can prove that the server is running what you expect, how do you know that some box, after https is peeled off, but before the request makes it to the server, is not sending the same request off to some other, malicious, server?
      - josh2600 8y ago
        I am going to say this one more time because I think it's a real point and I think you're dismissing it out of hand is unreasonable: there are things that can be learned from the server. It's one thing to tell people that you aren't logging anything. It's another thing to show everyone you're not logging anything except the account creation date and last access date by open sourcing the software and then show exactly that in a response to a national security letter: https://www.aclu.org/open-whisper-systems-subpoena-documents https://www.aclu.org/open-whisper-systems-subpoena-documents.
        zeeboo 8y ago

by zeeboo 8y ago

josh2600 8y ago

It would be great to audit all of the software running on all of the routers I use. I hope that we someday move to a model where all routers run open-source attestable software. Let me phrase this another way: if there's nothing to hide on the server, why isn't it open source? We can go back and forth on this forever. My position is simple: strictly speaking, it's more rational to trust open source software. Trusting closed source software ultimately boils down to "trust me". I would love to reduce the degrees to which we have to blindly trust the systems we use.

zeeboo 8y ago
And yet, all of the routers are not audited, and I presume you believe in the security of some applications that use them. In other words, the trusted base of the system does not depend on all of the components in the system (you start with the assumption that any closed components are hostile). The keybase servers are exactly the same. The answer is that they do have things to hide: anti-spam/anti-scam systems, for example. The question is if they are hiding something that matters for security. You can determine this by auditing only the client. Sure, open source software is great, and has many uses. In this case, it has no use in ensuring that keybase is secure. Somehow, you don't have to trust a great many components in the secure software you use on a daily basis, and yet you have to trust keybase's servers because.. reasons? And somehow this trust is important even though you'd still be blindly trusting that they're running what you hope. I won't argue that some people would benefit from the server being open source, but to argue that open sourcing it has anything to do with security is just inane and FUD.
- josh2600 8y ago
  The question boils down to "what can an attacker learn by owning the server" and right now you don't know. You can pretend that doesn't matter, but it's not inane or FUD. You have to model the whole system to understand the threat model. Anything less is blind trust.
  - zeeboo 8y ago
    You can know exactly what the attacker can learn because you can see ALL of the information that your client passes to the server by auditing ONLY the client. Your argument applies equally well to every single router or middle box on the internet, and it's just as wrong there. You prove that it doesn't matter by assuming that keybase is running the most malicious code possible, auditing your client, and deciding that the system is still secure. This is what auditing the client means. Additionally, to bring up this fact again because it has only been hand-waved away: Even if the server was open source, there is no guarantee they are running that code. Thus, there is no benefit to security until systems exist (somehow?) to prove the server is running the code you expect. Double additionally: even IF you can prove that the server is running what you expect, how do you know that some box, after https is peeled off, but before the request makes it to the server, is not sending the same request off to some other, malicious, server?
    - josh2600 8y ago
      I am going to say this one more time because I think it's a real point and I think you're dismissing it out of hand is unreasonable: there are things that can be learned from the server. It's one thing to tell people that you aren't logging anything. It's another thing to show everyone you're not logging anything except the account creation date and last access date by open sourcing the software and then show exactly that in a response to a national security letter: https://www.aclu.org/open-whisper-systems-subpoena-documents https://www.aclu.org/open-whisper-systems-subpoena-documents.
      - zeeboo 8y ago