3 ms·
A very good reason to shut down any automatic update software, moreover on a commercial OS. The whole "signing infrastructure" thing stops working when the amo
by baybal2 8y ago
A very good reason to shut down any automatic update software, moreover on a commercial OS.
The whole "signing infrastructure" thing stops working when the amount of parties involved exceeds n=2.
When you have 10+ parties involved, the chance of missignage gets very real. Even if the signing is done on a "black box" as per best practice, it offers no protection if signing decision is made by a party with blind trust in incoming packages as happens in a big company setting.
- acdha 8y ago> A very good reason to shut down any automatic update software, moreover on a commercial OS. This is dangerous and irresponsible general advice. 99.9999…something percent of users will be better off getting updates on a schedule more recent than “never”. Following your advice would simply mean that millions of people get rooted because they postponed the updates for things which were known threats in the wild. The very small percentage of high-value targets are the ones who can consider this because they also have defense budgets measured in the millions and can afford to do things like inspecting updates and aggressively monitoring for changes in network activity, etc. What it does tell you is that there is a cost to using software from companies with lax security practice such as ASUS: > Kamluk said ASUS continued to use one of the compromised certificates to sign its own files for at least a month after Kaspersky notified the company of the problem, though it has since stopped. But Kamluk said ASUS has still not invalidated the two compromised certificates, which means the attackers or anyone else with access to the un-expired certificate could still sign malicious files with it, and machines would view those files as legitimate ASUS files. That's a good cue to suggest that if you're security conscious you want to pick vendors who share that value.
- baybal2 8y agoThe one logic that is dangerous here is that of blind faith in signing ecosystem. MITM on windows update with forged certificate few years ago was just few minutes away from being a global emergency for Windows users. The only thing that kept it contained was that attackers did not figure out to hijack routing to real windows update servers. For 99% of users using windows update, that would've been an instant virus install - so much for security. The only security measures that are worth implementing are, obviously, the ones which work.
- acdha 8y ago> The only security measures that are worth implementing are, obviously, the ones which work. Which is why I don't think the right answer is taking steps which ensure users won't install security updates. The scenario you mentioned is better addressed by other means — CA pinning, certificate transparency — and, unsurprisingly, those are the measures being implemented on a wide scale.
- wedn3sday 8y agoWhats the alternative? Building from source? But wait, what if my compiler was compromised, better build my compiler from source, but wait .... I guess every user on every computer has to write all their own programs in assembly.
- baybal2 8y agoDisable automatic update installs, and check if updates being suggested make sense. It is even more easier for Windows users, as updates for you come in big clumps, and truly emergency level security updates do get into mainstream news.