The plane isn't airworthy in an MCAS upset condition resulting from faulty AOA sensor. That's because numerous contraindications are happening in the cockpit as

The plane isn't airworthy in an MCAS upset condition resulting from faulty AOA sensor. That's because numerous contraindications are happening in the cockpit as a result, including the failed side stick shaker activating. In the Lion Air 34 and 610 flights, the stick shaker was active almost continuously. That's not airworthy. Also, the autopilot uses stabilizer trim. If you turn stabilizer trim to cutoff, you have no autopilot. Also, the emergency airworthiness directive says it's possible a runaway continues even after stabilizer trim is set to cutoff: If runaway continues, hold the stabilizer trim wheel against rotation and trim the airplane manually. Once there was a second crash, with stabilizer jackscrew in the full nose down position, it was untenable to allow the planes to be considered airworthy, for the very central reason that we don't completely understand what happened and how to avoid it. The proper response in aviation safety is not to assume pilots are doing the wrong thing upon receipt of an emergency airworthiness directive. It's to assume they are following the directive. You don't just pretend they're morons and keep on subjecting the general public to risk, while you guess at what the problem is.