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I think the issue is that Boeing didn't see a potential MCAS failure as really any different from any other cause of runaway trim, for which there was well-esta
by ams6110 8y ago
I think the issue is that Boeing didn't see a potential MCAS failure as really any different from any other cause of runaway trim, for which there was well-established procedure and training. Clearly at least not all pilots seem to recognize this in time, particularly with other distractions caused by a faulty AoA reading, such as stick shaker, other warnings and alarms, and all of that happening at low altitude.
- cjbprime 8y agoI don't think that matters here, though I agree with what you said. There's also going to be redundancy on the other mechanisms that can lead to runaway trim, because runaway trim can be catastrophic, because we don't assume that pilots are perfect, and because (as you say) runaway trim can happen in situations where the ground will necessarily arrive before your recovery does. I think it takes around thirty seconds for the trim motor to move you from one end (where both crashed planes had it) of the jackscrew to the other. And that's with the motor! If you cut out the motor because it was literally trying to kill you -- and as Boeing advises you to -- you'll have to use the hand crank and it will take much longer. Runaway trim at low altitude is death. It really seems to me that the MAX as shipped was not plausibly airworthy (due to the use of a single sensor). I think even Boeing's going to agree eventually.