5 ms·
I understand that, but I believe they do not have the correct mentality here. I'm not certain how many of the people saying that have worked on systems as sensi
by EpicEng 8y ago
I understand that, but I believe they do not have the correct mentality here. I'm not certain how many of the people saying that have worked on systems as sensitive as FB. They think it's easier to screw this up because, for them, it is, but they don't operate at this level.
This sort of thing should not be any easier to screw up when you operate at the scale of FB. If it happens then you have the wrong procedures in place. In my personal example our logs and logging practices/code were audited in the same way our DB layer was. There was no difference; if a system touches sensitive data, it is a massive vulnerability.
- Alex3917 8y agoThis. If you have two or three engineers at a startup it's a very easy mistake to make. With thousands of engineers it's an impossible mistake to make, so it could have only been done purposely.
- JohnFen 8y agoAnd even with a startup of two or three engineers, it's pretty much unforgivable.
- Alex3917 8y agoIt depends on how many users you have and what sort of data you're protecting. If you have a billion users then sending password reset tokens to your analytics provider is a very serious vulnerability. If you have 100 users and you're running a generic message board then it's not really a vulnerability because the difficulty of that method of attacking the assets under protection almost certainly exceeds their value.
- marshray 8y ago> that method of attacking the assets under protection almost certainly exceeds their value This was most likely the reasoning Sony had used (prior to 2012) when deciding how to safeguard the account info of users who had registered for marketing promotions. It turned out that user credentials are unlike, say, office furniture, in that the cost of a data breach can vastly exceed the "value" of the protected "asset".
- Alex3917 8y agoThat's the best practice in the security world though. There's no such thing as an unhackable system, only systems where A) the cost of attacking them is more than the value of the assets under protection B) where the time it takes to attack the system is long enough for the attack to be detected. C.f. Bruce Schneier's book: https://www.schneier.com/books/beyond_fear/ https://www.schneier.com/books/beyond_fear/
- marshray 8y agoThat book was from 2003. This is Schneier in 2016: https://www.schneier.com/essays/archives/2016/03/data_is_a_toxic_asse.html https://www.schneier.com/essays/archives/2016/03/data_is_a_t... Data Is a Toxic Asset, So Why Not Throw It Out? "All this makes data a toxic asset, and it continues to be toxic as long as it sits in a company's computers and networks. The data is vulnerable, and the company is vulnerable. It's vulnerable to hackers and governments. It's vulnerable to employee error. And when there's a toxic data spill, millions of people can be affected. The 2015 Anthem Health data breach affected 80 million people. The 2013 Target Corp. breach affected 110 million. If data is toxic, why do organizations save it? ..."
- JohnFen 8y agoI really could not disagree with this more.
- discreteevent 8y ago"could only have been done purposely". In this case there's also a chance it was negligence. Who gives a shit. Move fast. A negligent culture can probably do more damage than the odd individual doing something deliberately.
- deleted 8y ago[deleted]