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In the software update that Boeing says is coming soon, MCAS will be modified to take readings from both sensors. If there is a meaningful disagreement between
by nyeormex 8y ago
In the software update that Boeing says is coming soon, MCAS will be modified to take readings from both sensors. If there is a meaningful disagreement between the readings, MCAS will be disabled.
How was MCAS rolled out and certified flight-ready when it did not rely on readings from both sensors? This breaks a cardinal law of airplane safety -- always have redundancy.
- Someone1234 8y agoBecause MCAS wasn't originally proposed as having enough authority to make dangerous flight inputs. It was allowed by that standard. Then Boeing increased how much authority the system had to pass a different part of certification without telling the FAA. > “The FAA believed the airplane was designed to the 0.6 limit, and that’s what the foreign regulatory authorities thought, too,” said an FAA engineer. “It makes a difference in your assessment of the hazard involved.” [...] > The discrepancy over this number is magnified by another element in the System Safety Analysis: The limit of the system’s authority to move the tail applies each time MCAS is triggered. And it can be triggered multiple times, as it was on the Lion Air flight. I'd suggest reading the full article/context: https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/failed-certification-faa-missed-safety-issues-in-the-737-max-system-implicated-in-the-lion-air-crash/ https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/faile...
- nyeormex 8y agoInteresting, thanks for this.
- deleted 8y ago[deleted]