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I answered further up but: yes, it did. The DUAL INPUT alarms were audible in the cockpit voice recording. However, unbeknowst to the captain, the co-pilot used

I answered further up but: yes, it did. The DUAL INPUT alarms were audible in the cockpit voice recording. However, unbeknowst to the captain, the co-pilot used priority takeover on his side. (This was always visible on the panel + there was an audible "Priority right" warning around the end) Source: https://www.vanityfair.fr/actualites/articles/vol-af-447-rio-paris-reconstitution-des-minutes-qui-ont-precede-le-crash/23618 https://www.vanityfair.fr/actualites/articles/vol-af-447-rio...

foldr 8y ago
I'm not sure where you're getting the "unbeknownst" from. In the cockpit voice recorder transcripts attached to the official accident reports, it seems that the pilots were aware of who had control at any given point in time.
- jandrese 8y ago
  I remember right before the impact with the water the captain finally realizing why his controls aren't doing anything and asking the co-pilot to finally let go of his stick. IIRC they never did throttle up however. Ultimately the co-pilot got tunnel vision and thought for some reason they were in an overspeed condition for most of the incident and failed to communicate that effectively with the rest of the crew. He made a couple of comments about it, but nobody else realized that he was attempting to correct for an overspeed condition in the middle of a dead stall, even when the airspeed indicator came back it seemed wrong to him because he thought they were going too fast.
  - foldr 8y ago
    The captain wasn't at the controls. I'm not sure what you mean by "throttle up". They were at full TOGA thrust.
    - jandrese 8y ago
      The copilot actually suggested to use the airbrakes at one point. Neither Bonin nor Robert, nor the third crew member (Marc Dubois, the captain) who entered the cockpit 90 seconds into the episode, recognized that the aircraft had stalled despite multiple cues. In the confusion, Bonin misinterpreted the situation as meaning that the plane was flying too fast and actually reduced the thrust and moved to apply the speedbrakes – the opposite of what was required to recover from the stall. Robert overruled him and attempted to take control, but Bonin continued to try and fly the plane. He and Robert made simultaneous and contradictory inputs, without realizing that they were doing so. By the time the crew worked out what was going on, there was insufficient altitude left to recover, and AF447 crashed into the ocean, with the loss of all 228 passengers and crew. But I've had the stick back the whole time! At last, Bonin tells the others the crucial fact whose import he has so grievously failed to understand himself. https://www.popularmechanics.com/flight/a3115/what-really-happened-aboard-air-france-447-6611877/ https://www.popularmechanics.com/flight/a3115/what-really-ha...
      - foldr 8y ago
        I know what the Popular Mechanics article says, but I cannot find any confirmation of the key points in the official accident report, which I take to be much more reliable.
        livatlantis 8y ago
        Here's the official report: https://www.bea.aero/uploads/tx_elyextendttnews/annexe.01_04.pdf https://www.bea.aero/uploads/tx_elyextendttnews/annexe.01_04... Page 28: The right-seat co-pilot Bonin says "j’ai l’impression qu’on a une vitesse de fou non qu’est-ce que vous en pensez ? "(I feel like we're speeding like crazy, what do you think?") Page 31: Same co-pilot "mais je suis à fond à cabrer depuis tout à l’heure " (But I've pulling back completely for a while), and this while the cockpit is screaming "Dual Input" (so this means that the other pilot was inputting as well, thus "unbeknownst" in my original comment). Same page, right after, the captain says, "non non non ne remonte plus là" (No, no, no, don't pull back any further". If you read the entire transcript, it's clear that there was persistent confusion as to who was in control, despite the dual-input warnings. AF447 is widely considered to be a failure in CRM, and a failure to recognize that they were in an aerodynamic stall (again, despite the warnings). They didn't trust the plane with the information it was providing, which is probably why they ignored these warnings.

foldr 8y ago

I'm not sure where you're getting the "unbeknownst" from. In the cockpit voice recorder transcripts attached to the official accident reports, it seems that the pilots were aware of who had control at any given point in time.

jandrese 8y ago
I remember right before the impact with the water the captain finally realizing why his controls aren't doing anything and asking the co-pilot to finally let go of his stick. IIRC they never did throttle up however. Ultimately the co-pilot got tunnel vision and thought for some reason they were in an overspeed condition for most of the incident and failed to communicate that effectively with the rest of the crew. He made a couple of comments about it, but nobody else realized that he was attempting to correct for an overspeed condition in the middle of a dead stall, even when the airspeed indicator came back it seemed wrong to him because he thought they were going too fast.
- foldr 8y ago
  The captain wasn't at the controls. I'm not sure what you mean by "throttle up". They were at full TOGA thrust.
  - jandrese 8y ago
    The copilot actually suggested to use the airbrakes at one point. Neither Bonin nor Robert, nor the third crew member (Marc Dubois, the captain) who entered the cockpit 90 seconds into the episode, recognized that the aircraft had stalled despite multiple cues. In the confusion, Bonin misinterpreted the situation as meaning that the plane was flying too fast and actually reduced the thrust and moved to apply the speedbrakes – the opposite of what was required to recover from the stall. Robert overruled him and attempted to take control, but Bonin continued to try and fly the plane. He and Robert made simultaneous and contradictory inputs, without realizing that they were doing so. By the time the crew worked out what was going on, there was insufficient altitude left to recover, and AF447 crashed into the ocean, with the loss of all 228 passengers and crew. But I've had the stick back the whole time! At last, Bonin tells the others the crucial fact whose import he has so grievously failed to understand himself. https://www.popularmechanics.com/flight/a3115/what-really-happened-aboard-air-france-447-6611877/ https://www.popularmechanics.com/flight/a3115/what-really-ha...
    - foldr 8y ago
      I know what the Popular Mechanics article says, but I cannot find any confirmation of the key points in the official accident report, which I take to be much more reliable.
      - livatlantis 8y ago
        Here's the official report: https://www.bea.aero/uploads/tx_elyextendttnews/annexe.01_04.pdf https://www.bea.aero/uploads/tx_elyextendttnews/annexe.01_04... Page 28: The right-seat co-pilot Bonin says "j’ai l’impression qu’on a une vitesse de fou non qu’est-ce que vous en pensez ? "(I feel like we're speeding like crazy, what do you think?") Page 31: Same co-pilot "mais je suis à fond à cabrer depuis tout à l’heure " (But I've pulling back completely for a while), and this while the cockpit is screaming "Dual Input" (so this means that the other pilot was inputting as well, thus "unbeknownst" in my original comment). Same page, right after, the captain says, "non non non ne remonte plus là" (No, no, no, don't pull back any further". If you read the entire transcript, it's clear that there was persistent confusion as to who was in control, despite the dual-input warnings. AF447 is widely considered to be a failure in CRM, and a failure to recognize that they were in an aerodynamic stall (again, despite the warnings). They didn't trust the plane with the information it was providing, which is probably why they ignored these warnings.