I'm afraid everything you're saying is just very wrong: > [Boeing self-assessed] a failure of the [MCAS] system as one level below “catastrophic.” But even th

I'm afraid everything you're saying is just very wrong: > [Boeing self-assessed] a failure of the [MCAS] system as one level below “catastrophic.” But even that “hazardous” danger level should have precluded activation of the system based on input from a single sensor — and yet that’s how it was designed. -- https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/failed-certification-faa-missed-safety-issues-in-the-737-max-system-implicated-in-the-lion-air-crash/ https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/faile... Even at Boeing's understated safety risk, redundancy is required. And the system actually has much more risk than they stated, since it will eventually totally deflect the stabilizer -- as happened to both fatal flights, with the jackscrews found in their farthest position in the wrecks.