4 ms·

I suppose similar in terms of the right place a the right time would be the QF32 incident[0], where by chance there were two additional pilots in the cockpit; a

by ruytlm 8y ago

I suppose similar in terms of the right place a the right time would be the QF32 incident[0], where by chance there were two additional pilots in the cockpit; a check captain, and a supervising check captain who was training that check captain. [0]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qantas_Flight_32 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qantas_Flight_32

inferiorhuman 8y ago
More to the point, this reflects positively on Lion Air because it means that the pilots in the forward facing seats properly took advice into account. This is good crew resource management. Check out the Asiana crash at SFO for an example of where CRM failed hard. The pilot flying in that case was told by the other two pilots in the cockpit how to avoid the crash and he STILL flew a perfectly serviceable plane into the ground in perfect weather on an extremely easy visual approach.
- twblalock 8y ago
  > More to the point, this reflects positively on Lion Air because it means that the pilots in the forward facing seats properly took advice into account. This is good crew resource management. It's good the pilots took advice -- but they should not have needed that advice because they should have been trained to operate the system properly. The whole thing reflects very poorly overall: - The pilots were not trained properly on the new system, and a third pilot who happened to be hitching a ride had to tell them how to operate the plane. - The plane was allowed to fly again the next day despite the malfunction, none of the pilots flying it were properly trained, and everybody died. - The incident was not reported properly at the time, nor was it reported after the same plane had crashed the next day.
  - inferiorhuman 8y ago
    The pilots were not trained properly on the new system It's hard to train for something that doesn't exist according to Boeing The plane was allowed to fly again the next day despite the malfunction The plane was serviced between flights, and assuming that Lion Air actually did what they claimed, Lion Air maintenance followed the Boeing instructions by the book. The incident was not reported properly at the time The malfunction was written up in the maintenance log and the issues were addressed. Unfortunately because Boeing refused to disclose the existence of MCAS the pilots wrote it up both as what they saw (EFS non-op, IAS disagree), and if memory serves, they also suspected the one algorithm they knew about (STS)[1]. 1: https://www.pprune.org/showthread.php?p=10295557 https://www.pprune.org/showthread.php?p=10295557
    - twblalock 8y ago
      > It's hard to train for something that doesn't exist according to Boeing From the article: > The so-called dead-head pilot on the earlier flight from Bali to Jakarta told the crew to cut power to the motor driving the nose down, according to the people familiar, part of a checklist that all pilots are required to memorize. Clearly only one of the pilots memorized the checklist, but they were all required to do so. Presumably the pilots who crashed the plane the next day didn't memorize it either.
      - inferiorhuman 8y ago
        Clearly only one of the pilots memorized the checklist I've already posted the checklist. If you've memorized the checklist you'd know that it says to stop if the trimming stops once you hit the push buttons on the yoke. MCAS stops trimming when you manually input opposite trim (and you can see this on the black box graphs from the preliminary report).
burfog 8y ago
Possibly a better example, with a DC-10 instructor on the plane as a passenger being pressed into service: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Airlines_Flight_232 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Airlines_Flight_232

by ruytlm 8y ago

inferiorhuman 8y ago

More to the point, this reflects positively on Lion Air because it means that the pilots in the forward facing seats properly took advice into account. This is good crew resource management. Check out the Asiana crash at SFO for an example of where CRM failed hard. The pilot flying in that case was told by the other two pilots in the cockpit how to avoid the crash and he STILL flew a perfectly serviceable plane into the ground in perfect weather on an extremely easy visual approach.

twblalock 8y ago
> More to the point, this reflects positively on Lion Air because it means that the pilots in the forward facing seats properly took advice into account. This is good crew resource management. It's good the pilots took advice -- but they should not have needed that advice because they should have been trained to operate the system properly. The whole thing reflects very poorly overall: - The pilots were not trained properly on the new system, and a third pilot who happened to be hitching a ride had to tell them how to operate the plane. - The plane was allowed to fly again the next day despite the malfunction, none of the pilots flying it were properly trained, and everybody died. - The incident was not reported properly at the time, nor was it reported after the same plane had crashed the next day.
- inferiorhuman 8y ago
  The pilots were not trained properly on the new system It's hard to train for something that doesn't exist according to Boeing The plane was allowed to fly again the next day despite the malfunction The plane was serviced between flights, and assuming that Lion Air actually did what they claimed, Lion Air maintenance followed the Boeing instructions by the book. The incident was not reported properly at the time The malfunction was written up in the maintenance log and the issues were addressed. Unfortunately because Boeing refused to disclose the existence of MCAS the pilots wrote it up both as what they saw (EFS non-op, IAS disagree), and if memory serves, they also suspected the one algorithm they knew about (STS)[1]. 1: https://www.pprune.org/showthread.php?p=10295557 https://www.pprune.org/showthread.php?p=10295557
  - twblalock 8y ago
    > It's hard to train for something that doesn't exist according to Boeing From the article: > The so-called dead-head pilot on the earlier flight from Bali to Jakarta told the crew to cut power to the motor driving the nose down, according to the people familiar, part of a checklist that all pilots are required to memorize. Clearly only one of the pilots memorized the checklist, but they were all required to do so. Presumably the pilots who crashed the plane the next day didn't memorize it either.
    - inferiorhuman 8y ago
      Clearly only one of the pilots memorized the checklist I've already posted the checklist. If you've memorized the checklist you'd know that it says to stop if the trimming stops once you hit the push buttons on the yoke. MCAS stops trimming when you manually input opposite trim (and you can see this on the black box graphs from the preliminary report).

burfog 8y ago

Possibly a better example, with a DC-10 instructor on the plane as a passenger being pressed into service: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Airlines_Flight_232 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Airlines_Flight_232