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> Suppose you have two theories, and you run an experiment whose results produce two assertions, each couched in the language of their respective theories, (I'd
by pdonis 8y ago
> Suppose you have two theories, and you run an experiment whose results produce two assertions, each couched in the language of their respective theories, (I'd call these assertions facts).
I wouldn't. An experiment will produce one set of "assertions", about what was done and what happened. Those are facts.
Different theories might add different "assertions" on top of that, but that doesn't change what was done and what happened in the experiment, and the theoretical "assertions" aren't facts. They're theories.
> So you've got a bunch of mirrors and a pattern of light, and then later in the day you have the same pattern of light. That's not facts, that's just phenomena.
No, they're facts. What you are calling "phenomena" are facts. At least, I call them facts.
> a fact is some correspondence between a model (which lives in a theory) and some phenomenon (which lives in reality).
No, I would not call that a fact. The phenomenon is the fact. The correspondence is a successful test of the model.
To go all the way back to what I quoted from you to start this subthread: the question you asked was "which facts to use?" And my answer was "the ones that are confirmed by experiments". Now that I see what you meant by "facts", I think the way you should have phrased your question is simply "which theoretical models to use?" And the answer is still "the ones that are confirmed by experiments", but with the added note that "confirmed by experiments" means "confirmed as correctly describing the facts".
- __MatrixMan__ 8y agoIf we water down the label "fact" so that it represents mere sense data--just the perception of an interferometer's output that happens to not vary based on time or orientation--then what good are facts anyway? For them to be useful, they need to be in some way convincing, don't they?
- pdonis 8y ago> If we water down the label "fact" so that it represents mere sense data Not just sense data, but the records of sense data: the records of what was done and what happened during the experiment. Those records make it possible for other people besides the experimenters to know what was done and what happened. Without that the facts would be useless because only the experimenters themselves would ever know them.