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> reality is the authority Suppose you have two theories, and you run an experiment whose results produce two assertions, each couched in the language of their

> reality is the authority Suppose you have two theories, and you run an experiment whose results produce two assertions, each couched in the language of their respective theories, (I'd call these assertions facts). You say that reality is the authority on whether the two assertions represent the same underlying fact or different underlying facts, but it's not like there's some oracle that I can consult in the matter. So how does using reality as an authority help me individuate these facts? And if it doesn't, then of what use is the idea that facts don't change when theories change, (except perhaps as a political too towards the discrediting of new ideas). > The facts are the particular experimental apparatus Michelson and Morley used and the particular numbers they recorded when they made their measurements. So you've got a bunch of mirrors and a pattern of light, and then later in the day you have the same pattern of light. That's not facts, that's just phenomena. Facts are supposed to convince me of something, and they work because they take advantage of my having already accepted the theory that supports them. I have to suspect that anybody who presents me "facts" that don't have this quality has something to gain by distracting from their unwillingness to argue for the superiority of the their theory. (Debate antics aside, thanks for the conversation. I've been having fun.) Also, I think you missed my point about the trains. The statement that nobody bothered relativize until Einstein was equivalent to this: > A train moves at 10 mph and a bullet fired from a window in the direction of the train's motion moves at 10000 mph. The speed of the bullet as measured by an observer standing beside the track is 10010 mph. It was initially poor style to relativize this fact because its supporting theory had no competitors. It was only when Einstein proposed that simple addition was insufficient that relativizing it made sense. As for models, I've done a bit of model theory in geometry, and I've also studied models in physics (such as the Schrodinger model of the atom), but these don't resemble a pile of mirrors and a pattern of light--they're just the sort of thing theories are made of. If I'm missing some other sort of model, please let me know. As near as I can tell, a fact is some correspondence between a model (which lives in a theory) and some phenomenon (which lives in reality). As such, facts without corresponding theories are nonsensical.

pdonis 8y ago
> Suppose you have two theories, and you run an experiment whose results produce two assertions, each couched in the language of their respective theories, (I'd call these assertions facts). I wouldn't. An experiment will produce one set of "assertions", about what was done and what happened. Those are facts. Different theories might add different "assertions" on top of that, but that doesn't change what was done and what happened in the experiment, and the theoretical "assertions" aren't facts. They're theories. > So you've got a bunch of mirrors and a pattern of light, and then later in the day you have the same pattern of light. That's not facts, that's just phenomena. No, they're facts. What you are calling "phenomena" are facts. At least, I call them facts. > a fact is some correspondence between a model (which lives in a theory) and some phenomenon (which lives in reality). No, I would not call that a fact. The phenomenon is the fact. The correspondence is a successful test of the model. To go all the way back to what I quoted from you to start this subthread: the question you asked was "which facts to use?" And my answer was "the ones that are confirmed by experiments". Now that I see what you meant by "facts", I think the way you should have phrased your question is simply "which theoretical models to use?" And the answer is still "the ones that are confirmed by experiments", but with the added note that "confirmed by experiments" means "confirmed as correctly describing the facts".
- __MatrixMan__ 8y ago
  If we water down the label "fact" so that it represents mere sense data--just the perception of an interferometer's output that happens to not vary based on time or orientation--then what good are facts anyway? For them to be useful, they need to be in some way convincing, don't they?
  - pdonis 8y ago
    > If we water down the label "fact" so that it represents mere sense data Not just sense data, but the records of sense data: the records of what was done and what happened during the experiment. Those records make it possible for other people besides the experimenters to know what was done and what happened. Without that the facts would be useless because only the experimenters themselves would ever know them.
pdonis 8y ago
> It was initially poor style to relativize this fact You're confusing facts with models again. The statement you give is not a fact: it's a prediction based on a theoretical model. Einstein proposed a different theoretical model, which we now know makes more accurate predictions. But no facts changed during this process. Thinking that switching models changed the facts is like thinking that switching from a less accurate map of a city to a more accurate map changes the layout of the streets in the actual city.
- __MatrixMan__ 8y ago
  Ok, so I'm trying to get my head around what you mean by a fact. You've said: > Michelson and Morley had a particular experimental setup and procedure and recorded particular numbers when they ran the experiment. I believe that the facts you're referring to must be on page 685 of this document: http://www.orgonelab.org/EtherDrift/MorleyMiller1905.pdf http://www.orgonelab.org/EtherDrift/MorleyMiller1905.pdf Can sense be made of it without first embracing the theory, for example, which indicates that light is made up of waves?
  - pdonis 8y ago
    > I believe that the facts you're referring to must be on page 685 of this document The azimuths and wavelengths at the top of that page are facts, yes. Also, the description on the preceding pages of how the experiment was conducted contains plenty of facts. The rest of p. 685 after the azimuths and wavelengths is all interpretation using a theoretical model.
    - __MatrixMan__ 8y ago
      I would call the first half of the page facts of optics, and the second half of the page facts of aether flow theory. The former are only true if you already accept some theory with sufficient machinery to map the device readout to a number corresponding with the concept 'wavelength'. And the latter are only true if you accept both optics and the aether theory that was popular at the time. I see that you're trying to get something to stand on, some objective and unchanging reality to hold constant while new theories come and go--and I don't deny you its existence, but I don't see how statements about it can be encoded without making reference the theories in use by the experimenter. Suppose that later these results need to be translated into the language of a new theory in order for them to be communicated with future generations (who may not know what a wavelength is). Once translated, would they not be new facts, made of new words and new numbers and true in a new theory? There are alternatives, but they seem awfully problematic to me.

pdonis 8y ago

> Suppose you have two theories, and you run an experiment whose results produce two assertions, each couched in the language of their respective theories, (I'd call these assertions facts). I wouldn't. An experiment will produce one set of "assertions", about what was done and what happened. Those are facts. Different theories might add different "assertions" on top of that, but that doesn't change what was done and what happened in the experiment, and the theoretical "assertions" aren't facts. They're theories. > So you've got a bunch of mirrors and a pattern of light, and then later in the day you have the same pattern of light. That's not facts, that's just phenomena. No, they're facts. What you are calling "phenomena" are facts. At least, I call them facts. > a fact is some correspondence between a model (which lives in a theory) and some phenomenon (which lives in reality). No, I would not call that a fact. The phenomenon is the fact. The correspondence is a successful test of the model. To go all the way back to what I quoted from you to start this subthread: the question you asked was "which facts to use?" And my answer was "the ones that are confirmed by experiments". Now that I see what you meant by "facts", I think the way you should have phrased your question is simply "which theoretical models to use?" And the answer is still "the ones that are confirmed by experiments", but with the added note that "confirmed by experiments" means "confirmed as correctly describing the facts".

__MatrixMan__ 8y ago
If we water down the label "fact" so that it represents mere sense data--just the perception of an interferometer's output that happens to not vary based on time or orientation--then what good are facts anyway? For them to be useful, they need to be in some way convincing, don't they?
- pdonis 8y ago
  > If we water down the label "fact" so that it represents mere sense data Not just sense data, but the records of sense data: the records of what was done and what happened during the experiment. Those records make it possible for other people besides the experimenters to know what was done and what happened. Without that the facts would be useless because only the experimenters themselves would ever know them.

pdonis 8y ago

> It was initially poor style to relativize this fact You're confusing facts with models again. The statement you give is not a fact: it's a prediction based on a theoretical model. Einstein proposed a different theoretical model, which we now know makes more accurate predictions. But no facts changed during this process. Thinking that switching models changed the facts is like thinking that switching from a less accurate map of a city to a more accurate map changes the layout of the streets in the actual city.

__MatrixMan__ 8y ago
Ok, so I'm trying to get my head around what you mean by a fact. You've said: > Michelson and Morley had a particular experimental setup and procedure and recorded particular numbers when they ran the experiment. I believe that the facts you're referring to must be on page 685 of this document: http://www.orgonelab.org/EtherDrift/MorleyMiller1905.pdf http://www.orgonelab.org/EtherDrift/MorleyMiller1905.pdf Can sense be made of it without first embracing the theory, for example, which indicates that light is made up of waves?
- pdonis 8y ago
  > I believe that the facts you're referring to must be on page 685 of this document The azimuths and wavelengths at the top of that page are facts, yes. Also, the description on the preceding pages of how the experiment was conducted contains plenty of facts. The rest of p. 685 after the azimuths and wavelengths is all interpretation using a theoretical model.
  - __MatrixMan__ 8y ago
    I would call the first half of the page facts of optics, and the second half of the page facts of aether flow theory. The former are only true if you already accept some theory with sufficient machinery to map the device readout to a number corresponding with the concept 'wavelength'. And the latter are only true if you accept both optics and the aether theory that was popular at the time. I see that you're trying to get something to stand on, some objective and unchanging reality to hold constant while new theories come and go--and I don't deny you its existence, but I don't see how statements about it can be encoded without making reference the theories in use by the experimenter. Suppose that later these results need to be translated into the language of a new theory in order for them to be communicated with future generations (who may not know what a wavelength is). Once translated, would they not be new facts, made of new words and new numbers and true in a new theory? There are alternatives, but they seem awfully problematic to me.