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> So far as I can tell, there is no such authority for facts. Huh? You just described it: reality is the authority. > I think this situation is simpler if the
by pdonis 8y ago
> So far as I can tell, there is no such authority for facts.
Huh? You just described it: reality is the authority.
> I think this situation is simpler if these all count as separate facts.
No, they are different theoretical descriptions of the facts. The facts are the particular experimental apparatus Michelson and Morley used and the particular numbers they recorded when they made their measurements.
> Do "the facts of gravity" include the predictions made by the theory of gravity?
Of course not. Predictions aren't facts. They're things that you compare with facts in order to test theoretical models.
> Speaking of Einstein, before he pubished his paper on special relativity, wasn't it a fact that the velocity of a bullet fired from a train (relative to the track) is the sum of the train's velocity and the bullet's velocity?
No. As far as I know nobody at that time had made accurate enough measurements of the velocity of anything to be able to test the Newtonian prediction vs. the relativity prediction. But that doesn't mean the Newtonian prediction was correct before relativity was discovered. It certainly doesn't mean that something changed about the world described by physical models when physicists switched from using the Newtonian model to using the relativity model. All that changed was the model: the world the model was describing didn't change.
> Given that we can't know which facts might later need to be relativized
Facts never need to be relativized. Relativizing is something that happens when you switch theoretical models. You seem to be consistently confusing facts with models.
- xfs 8y agoRaw facts are meaningless without models, theories, or even, ideologies. Without meaning you can't do anything useful with it, or anything "that works." You always have to have a theory in order to predict the future based on facts and then have experiments to verify the predictions. No meaningful experiments can exist without a establishing theory. All facts are alternative facts in the sense that facts are only accessible and made meaningful through theories and there is no one true theory.
- pdonis 8y ago> Raw facts are meaningless without models, theories, or even, ideologies. No, they're not. They just don't allow you to make predictions without a model. But you don't need to agree on a theoretical model to agree that, for example, Michelson and Morley had a particular experimental setup and procedure and recorded particular numbers when they ran the experiment. > You always have to have a theory in order to predict the future based on facts and then have experiments to verify the predictions. A "theory" in this sense can be just about anything, from a simple guess to a detailed mathematical model with lots of ramifications. So I don't see that much is gained by making this observation.
- xfs 8y agoAllow me to clarify: facts are meaningless in the literal sense that facts are devoid of meaning without interpretation. When you say facts be confirmed by experiments, the very confirmation already presupposes the existence of criteria by which you prove or disprove facts. Those criteria are precisely what constitutes theories. Now back to the original question, it's true you can establish facts through experiments, but since facts are always mediated by theories, it's not very useful to discuss how one deals with purely raw facts and more useful to discuss how one approaches truth from mediated facts. I think OP meant facts in this sense.
- pdonis 8y ago> When you say facts be confirmed by experiments I didn't say facts are confirmed by experiments. Facts are the experimental setup and results: what was done and what happened. Nothing has to be "confirmed"; the facts just are. Theoretical models can be confirmed by experiments, but models are not facts. You appear to have the same confusion about this that MatrixMan has.
- __MatrixMan__ 8y ago> reality is the authority Suppose you have two theories, and you run an experiment whose results produce two assertions, each couched in the language of their respective theories, (I'd call these assertions facts). You say that reality is the authority on whether the two assertions represent the same underlying fact or different underlying facts, but it's not like there's some oracle that I can consult in the matter. So how does using reality as an authority help me individuate these facts? And if it doesn't, then of what use is the idea that facts don't change when theories change, (except perhaps as a political too towards the discrediting of new ideas). > The facts are the particular experimental apparatus Michelson and Morley used and the particular numbers they recorded when they made their measurements. So you've got a bunch of mirrors and a pattern of light, and then later in the day you have the same pattern of light. That's not facts, that's just phenomena. Facts are supposed to convince me of something, and they work because they take advantage of my having already accepted the theory that supports them. I have to suspect that anybody who presents me "facts" that don't have this quality has something to gain by distracting from their unwillingness to argue for the superiority of the their theory. (Debate antics aside, thanks for the conversation. I've been having fun.) Also, I think you missed my point about the trains. The statement that nobody bothered relativize until Einstein was equivalent to this: > A train moves at 10 mph and a bullet fired from a window in the direction of the train's motion moves at 10000 mph. The speed of the bullet as measured by an observer standing beside the track is 10010 mph. It was initially poor style to relativize this fact because its supporting theory had no competitors. It was only when Einstein proposed that simple addition was insufficient that relativizing it made sense. As for models, I've done a bit of model theory in geometry, and I've also studied models in physics (such as the Schrodinger model of the atom), but these don't resemble a pile of mirrors and a pattern of light--they're just the sort of thing theories are made of. If I'm missing some other sort of model, please let me know. As near as I can tell, a fact is some correspondence between a model (which lives in a theory) and some phenomenon (which lives in reality). As such, facts without corresponding theories are nonsensical.
- pdonis 8y ago> Suppose you have two theories, and you run an experiment whose results produce two assertions, each couched in the language of their respective theories, (I'd call these assertions facts). I wouldn't. An experiment will produce one set of "assertions", about what was done and what happened. Those are facts. Different theories might add different "assertions" on top of that, but that doesn't change what was done and what happened in the experiment, and the theoretical "assertions" aren't facts. They're theories. > So you've got a bunch of mirrors and a pattern of light, and then later in the day you have the same pattern of light. That's not facts, that's just phenomena. No, they're facts. What you are calling "phenomena" are facts. At least, I call them facts. > a fact is some correspondence between a model (which lives in a theory) and some phenomenon (which lives in reality). No, I would not call that a fact. The phenomenon is the fact. The correspondence is a successful test of the model. To go all the way back to what I quoted from you to start this subthread: the question you asked was "which facts to use?" And my answer was "the ones that are confirmed by experiments". Now that I see what you meant by "facts", I think the way you should have phrased your question is simply "which theoretical models to use?" And the answer is still "the ones that are confirmed by experiments", but with the added note that "confirmed by experiments" means "confirmed as correctly describing the facts".