I don't disagree with what you're saying schematically. I agree that there's a lot of propaganda that serves the money machine, and that it's not suitable for

I don't disagree with what you're saying schematically. I agree that there's a lot of propaganda that serves the money machine, and that it's not suitable for most founders. I think the specific numbers you're providing are tricky, because generally, getting to $200 M exit within, say, a decade, involves institutional funding (VC, PE, "growth", whatever). (As a relatively small non-Valley funder, I would generally also prefer to be an investor in a company that exits at $200 M with a much lower risk than a $600 M exit, given that getting to $600 M might mean another $50-100 M in late-stage, first-money-out, preference overhang capital.) I think the real question usually has orders of magnitude difference here. Internally-fundable businesses tend to opt for business models like services, consulting, etc., since they can scale without a lot of invested equity. Hence a lot of times you wind up growing a business semi-organically and end up getting a 1-2x revenue multiple for a modest growth, modest gross-margin, consulting type business. Or, if you do get a good SaaS operation going and grow it organcially, you might find yourself faced with the late-arriving roll-up play heavily funded by private equity, who will buy you at a 3-5x in an attempt to consolidate the market and float it at a 6-10x. And yes, if you as a founder have a 90% shot at $10 M in 10 years, vs. a 9% shot at $100 M or a 0.9% shot at $1 B, most rational founders should and do take the safe road. Stipulated :) But in my experience and observation, getting over the hurdle of product-market fit and a repeatable go to market strategy is what tends to kill startups. If you get that PMF and GTM working, it often makes sense to fund hypergrowth. If you don't, the company is walking dead anyway.