5 ms·

On the one hand, some very good points. I think a survey of 20th century history strongly supports the idea that Big Media helped determine what kinds of leade

On the one hand, some very good points. I think a survey of 20th century history strongly supports the idea that Big Media helped determine what kinds of leadership we got, and so it must be the case that 21st century internet media are doing the same. The comparisons of similar trends in education and commerce are worth reading (if over-long). On the other hand, the underlying assumption is that the revolt against elite policy preferences, not only in the U.S. but in Europe and elsewhere, is entirely devoid of rational motivation. It discounts without comment the possibility that the pre-internet style of governance had substantive problems which the working class didn't like (e.g. globalization leading to a race to the bottom in manufacturing wages). Surely the new methods of information access and distribution are having an impact. But it's not the only, or even necessarily the most important, driver.

coldtea 8y ago
>On the other hand, the underlying assumption is that the revolt against elite policy preferences, not only in the U.S. but in Europe and elsewhere, is entirely devoid of rational motivation. That's the mainstream narrative, because like Maria Antoinette the 10% cannot ever consider why anyone (unless they're a faulty person) would ever be dissatisfied with the status quo in power, business, culture, economy, and so on. Except in their constrained pet causes, of course.
vanderZwan 8y ago
> It discounts without comment the possibility that the pre-internet style of governance had substantive problems which the working class didn't like (e.g. globalization leading to a race to the bottom in manufacturing wages). It's there between the lines: the author mentions the power of the big companies in the 20th century to shape the narrative through mass media and a lack of proper information among the public, and how that power is now crumbling and how the narrative is being democratized. Basically, it boils down to mutual knowledge, and large shifts in that causes power-shifts in society. [0] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3-son3EJTrU&t=7m40s https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3-son3EJTrU&t=7m40s
jstanley 8y ago
> On the other hand, the underlying assumption is that the revolt against elite policy preferences, not only in the U.S. but in Europe and elsewhere, is entirely devoid of rational motivation. It discounts without comment the possibility that the pre-internet style of governance had substantive problems which the working class didn't like (e.g. globalization leading to a race to the bottom in manufacturing wages). I didn't get that from the article at all. The article was purely descriptive, without ascribing any value judgment.
- mirimir 8y ago
  I didn't get that from TFA either. If anything, the author seemed somewhat positive about the implications.
  - phamilton 8y ago
    "we’re moving from a narrative oligopoly to a narrative democracy" That was pretty clear to me that the past had plenty of problems.
    - mirimir 8y ago
      True. But there were also concerns about chaos. And recall that the US Founders were concerned. And they just had newspapers and handbills to worry about.
pjc50 8y ago
> pre-internet style of governance had substantive problems which the working class didn't like (e.g. globalization leading to a race to the bottom in manufacturing wages). "Observing a problem", "diagnosing causes", and "presenting workable solutions" are three completely different things though. Wage stagnation leading to quality-of-life declines is the first of these - people can notice this immediately in their life. Diganosing "globalisation" as the problem is harder and more complicated (would the US really have been better off trying to be a manufacturing autarky for the second half of the 20th century?). And the proposed solutions .. well, this is where it gets really bad. The existing elite have done a very good job of suppressing the peaceful, workable solutions; various sorts of social inclusion and redistibution. That leaves only the unworkable and disastrous solutions out there.
- xyzzyz 8y ago
  > Wage stagnation leading to quality-of-life declines is the first of these - people can notice this immediately in their life. Despite popular graphs making rounds, there has been little if any wage stagnation. Moreover, people are also really bad at noticing it: a median and an average Americans now have better housing situation than 50 years ago, in terms of actual living space available for them, fewer roommates, better quality of housing, and yet the sentiment is the opposite.
  - lotsofpulp 8y ago
    Source? Every piece of data I see shows that the top quintile is running away with almost all of the income and wealth growth (especially the top decile), and that economic opportunities are being concentrated in certain urban areas resulting in higher rents and property prices, all the while home ownership and stable careers are in decline. Having a bigger room and smart phone does little in the face of higher variance of one’s future security. The compounding nature of the game’s fruits are clearly evident now, and people rightfully are afraid of permanently falling behind.
  - rossdavidh 8y ago
    I would say the best analysis of this is by Peter Turchin: http://peterturchin.com/cliodynamica/population-immiseration-in-america/ http://peterturchin.com/cliodynamica/population-immiseration...

coldtea 8y ago

>On the other hand, the underlying assumption is that the revolt against elite policy preferences, not only in the U.S. but in Europe and elsewhere, is entirely devoid of rational motivation. That's the mainstream narrative, because like Maria Antoinette the 10% cannot ever consider why anyone (unless they're a faulty person) would ever be dissatisfied with the status quo in power, business, culture, economy, and so on. Except in their constrained pet causes, of course.

vanderZwan 8y ago

> It discounts without comment the possibility that the pre-internet style of governance had substantive problems which the working class didn't like (e.g. globalization leading to a race to the bottom in manufacturing wages). It's there between the lines: the author mentions the power of the big companies in the 20th century to shape the narrative through mass media and a lack of proper information among the public, and how that power is now crumbling and how the narrative is being democratized. Basically, it boils down to mutual knowledge, and large shifts in that causes power-shifts in society. [0] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3-son3EJTrU&t=7m40s https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3-son3EJTrU&t=7m40s

jstanley 8y ago

> On the other hand, the underlying assumption is that the revolt against elite policy preferences, not only in the U.S. but in Europe and elsewhere, is entirely devoid of rational motivation. It discounts without comment the possibility that the pre-internet style of governance had substantive problems which the working class didn't like (e.g. globalization leading to a race to the bottom in manufacturing wages). I didn't get that from the article at all. The article was purely descriptive, without ascribing any value judgment.

mirimir 8y ago
I didn't get that from TFA either. If anything, the author seemed somewhat positive about the implications.
- phamilton 8y ago
  "we’re moving from a narrative oligopoly to a narrative democracy" That was pretty clear to me that the past had plenty of problems.
  - mirimir 8y ago
    True. But there were also concerns about chaos. And recall that the US Founders were concerned. And they just had newspapers and handbills to worry about.

pjc50 8y ago

> pre-internet style of governance had substantive problems which the working class didn't like (e.g. globalization leading to a race to the bottom in manufacturing wages). "Observing a problem", "diagnosing causes", and "presenting workable solutions" are three completely different things though. Wage stagnation leading to quality-of-life declines is the first of these - people can notice this immediately in their life. Diganosing "globalisation" as the problem is harder and more complicated (would the US really have been better off trying to be a manufacturing autarky for the second half of the 20th century?). And the proposed solutions .. well, this is where it gets really bad. The existing elite have done a very good job of suppressing the peaceful, workable solutions; various sorts of social inclusion and redistibution. That leaves only the unworkable and disastrous solutions out there.

xyzzyz 8y ago
> Wage stagnation leading to quality-of-life declines is the first of these - people can notice this immediately in their life. Despite popular graphs making rounds, there has been little if any wage stagnation. Moreover, people are also really bad at noticing it: a median and an average Americans now have better housing situation than 50 years ago, in terms of actual living space available for them, fewer roommates, better quality of housing, and yet the sentiment is the opposite.
- lotsofpulp 8y ago
  Source? Every piece of data I see shows that the top quintile is running away with almost all of the income and wealth growth (especially the top decile), and that economic opportunities are being concentrated in certain urban areas resulting in higher rents and property prices, all the while home ownership and stable careers are in decline. Having a bigger room and smart phone does little in the face of higher variance of one’s future security. The compounding nature of the game’s fruits are clearly evident now, and people rightfully are afraid of permanently falling behind.
- rossdavidh 8y ago
  I would say the best analysis of this is by Peter Turchin: http://peterturchin.com/cliodynamica/population-immiseration-in-america/ http://peterturchin.com/cliodynamica/population-immiseration...