4 ms·
And one more thing - trim tabs should be separate airfoils, not an electronically set setting exactly for the purpose of reliability. That way, an elevator sho
by baybal2 8y ago
And one more thing - trim tabs should be separate airfoils, not an electronically set setting exactly for the purpose of reliability.
That way, an elevator should always have more authority than the trim tab, and be able to overpower it if it fails.
On other hand, independent trim tabs can work as reserve control surfaces if hydraulics fail.
The same design thinking is behind having engine reverse locks being physical parts, separately powered, and operated independently of electronic engine controls: a hard lock will always be able to overpower haywire electronics.
Same with emergency chassis deployment system on smaller planes, they are often designed to be able to physically disconnect/overpower motors that pull chassis, or chassis cowers if they jam or electronics bugs out.
- CarVac 8y agoTrim would never be a separate airfoil because that would be horrendous for efficiency. Instead they have an all-moving tailplane. They could have prevented this issue by slightly increasing the tailplane size to restore stability margin, but they didn't presumably for development cost and fuel efficiency reasons.
- baybal2 8y agoAre you really sure that it will be "horrendous?" That thinking remind me of people who try to economise on few microns of plastic we see in electronics OEM industry. Pro managers trying to shave microns from casing, ending up with multimillion dollar recalls, and that for savings not even amounting to few snickers bars.
- CydeWeys 8y agoYou're adding an entire new system. That's more wiring, more programming, more hydraulics, more moving parts, etc. It's far from trivial.
- baybal2 8y agoFar from trivial, but it was done in the past nevertheless. All things above were going away one after another, and replaced with often ineffectual electronic safeguards.
- ams6110 8y agoGuessing that changing the tail might also go beyond what would be allowed to stay within the 737 type rating?
- cmurf 8y agoTrim controlling stabilizer, yoke controlling elevator, and elevator being unable to counteract the more extreme ends of trim settings, is part of the original 737 design. They all behave that way, and 737 pilots are aware of this, and know they must neutralize trim to have ample elevator control. However, only the 737 MAX has MCAS, and MCAS doesn't take airspeed into account. An appropriate corrective action for a low airspeed stall, will be way too aggressive for a high airspeed stall (a rare event, suggests overly aggressive dive recovery leading to a stall). And designers + regulators assumed that pilots would treat such behavior the same as an ordinary runaway trim incident, but does it seem ordinary or is it a shockingly bad overcorrection? We've seen many times the scenario where pilots become so surprised at a particular situation that their rational ability to work through the problem can be compromised. Yes, transport pilots are substantially trained to avoid such a compromise, but problems at low altitude combined with the lack of a consistently positive rate of climb is an urgent situation. Pilots are hyper aware that recovery from either a dive or stall consumes a huge amount of altitude, which you simply don't have at low altitude. That itself could delay proper decision making: i.e. automation has betrayed us for unknown reasons, disable it now. With MCAS disabled, what's the 737 MAX stall behavior like? Is it meaningfully easier to unwittingly get into a stall?