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>The assumption that determinism precludes moral responsibility has turned out to be false. When did this happen? I missed that memo.

naasking 8y ago
I suppose it depends how deep you want to go on HN. If you're busy and you'll accept an argument from expertise, then the majority of philosophers are Compatibilists, with a tiny minority holding out for incompatibilism (something like 10%). If you want a review of the failures of every challenge meant to demonstrate how moral responsibility and determinism are incompatible, and that Compatibilism empirically matches our use of moral language and so is what people actually mean by free will, that will take more time.
- freshm087 8y ago
  For starters, majority of philosophers never make a stable ground for absolutist statements ("turned out to be false“). Compatibilism is a kind of comfortable opinion, because it simply avoids thorny questions regarding logic, and morality. E.g. C-sts belive that a criminal is guilty, when he allegedly acts in accordance with his will, because, as you noted, that's what people mean when they say "free will". However, it still may sound unconvincing when one believes that the criminal's mind contents was predetermined aeons before he was born.
  - naasking 8y ago
    > For starters, majority of philosophers never make a stable ground for absolutist statements ("turned out to be false“). Standards of evidence for HN are lower. Calling something false needs a preponderance of evidence, not a formal proof. Centuries of challenges attempting to show an inconsistency have all failed. > However, it still may sound unconvincing when one believes that the criminal's mind contents was predetermined aeons before he was born. Anything can be made to sound unconvincing when it's completely divorced from its context. The point in context, is that bad behaviour felt justified in the moment, and holding a learning agent responsible is the moral feedback needed to correct that error in judgement.
    - freshm087 8y ago
      holding a learning agent responsible is the moral feedback needed to correct that error in judgement. That's exactly where the trouble is. In case of strict logical determinism we correct nothing because everything is predestined. However, choosing limited definitions, and restricting ourselves in comfortable contexts we can certainly avoid discomfort of the thought. Not that I have better idea, but I see clearly why non-compatibilists say "word juggling" towards compatibilists.
      - naasking 8y ago
        > That's exactly where the trouble is. In case of strict logical determinism we correct nothing because everything is predestined. A predestined correction is still a correction though. Unless you assume "correction" to have some bizarre and probably incoherent non-deterministic meaning. In context, "correction" means "learning to choosing correctly as opposed to incorrectly", which is precisely what happens in this scenario. > However, choosing limited definitions, and restricting ourselves in comfortable contexts we can certainly avoid discomfort of the thought. I dispute this characterization. It's not "limited definitions" and "comfortable contexts" (presumably pejoratively), it's "appropriate definitions" and "relevant contexts". > but I see clearly why non-compatibilists say "word juggling" towards compatibilists. I think you'll find that the incompatibilists are just as guilty of this. They've spent centuries arguing for a definition of free will that no one actually holds. Philosophy is sometimes about drawing fine but relevant distinctions, and that's exactly what Compatibilism does: it carves out a fine line behind which we can make sense of holding intelligent learning agents responsible for their choices.
        freshm087 8y ago
        They've spent centuries arguing for a definition of free will that no one actually holds This statement is incorrect, and actually prove the very thing you intended to deny. It's not like adherents of C. held a plebiscite, isn't it? (And if they would, I dare to say they would be in danger of huge disappointment.) They made a choice to call an action free when it's inescapable consequence of a butterfly flapping wings millenia ago on another continent, but not free if it's e.g. equally inescapable consequence of a another human doing something recently, and closely (even if this forcing person is equally inescapably forced by a butterfly wings before). It is not, however, some sort of obvious conclusion, accepted by everybody. It's something C. philosophers prefer to call a common sense, because... well because this way we can make sense of things we do. So it feels much better. As a side-note, your explanation of 'correction' makes perfect sense if you took the C. pill already, but doesn't make any useful proof of C. One have to accept that the only available variant of future (if we are in a purely determinist universe) still presents a free choice between correct/incorrect. Which is a circular reference to basic presumption of C. Anyway, thank you for taking time to write the long response!

naasking 8y ago

I suppose it depends how deep you want to go on HN. If you're busy and you'll accept an argument from expertise, then the majority of philosophers are Compatibilists, with a tiny minority holding out for incompatibilism (something like 10%). If you want a review of the failures of every challenge meant to demonstrate how moral responsibility and determinism are incompatible, and that Compatibilism empirically matches our use of moral language and so is what people actually mean by free will, that will take more time.

freshm087 8y ago
For starters, majority of philosophers never make a stable ground for absolutist statements ("turned out to be false“). Compatibilism is a kind of comfortable opinion, because it simply avoids thorny questions regarding logic, and morality. E.g. C-sts belive that a criminal is guilty, when he allegedly acts in accordance with his will, because, as you noted, that's what people mean when they say "free will". However, it still may sound unconvincing when one believes that the criminal's mind contents was predetermined aeons before he was born.
- naasking 8y ago
  > For starters, majority of philosophers never make a stable ground for absolutist statements ("turned out to be false“). Standards of evidence for HN are lower. Calling something false needs a preponderance of evidence, not a formal proof. Centuries of challenges attempting to show an inconsistency have all failed. > However, it still may sound unconvincing when one believes that the criminal's mind contents was predetermined aeons before he was born. Anything can be made to sound unconvincing when it's completely divorced from its context. The point in context, is that bad behaviour felt justified in the moment, and holding a learning agent responsible is the moral feedback needed to correct that error in judgement.
  - freshm087 8y ago
    holding a learning agent responsible is the moral feedback needed to correct that error in judgement. That's exactly where the trouble is. In case of strict logical determinism we correct nothing because everything is predestined. However, choosing limited definitions, and restricting ourselves in comfortable contexts we can certainly avoid discomfort of the thought. Not that I have better idea, but I see clearly why non-compatibilists say "word juggling" towards compatibilists.
    - naasking 8y ago
      > That's exactly where the trouble is. In case of strict logical determinism we correct nothing because everything is predestined. A predestined correction is still a correction though. Unless you assume "correction" to have some bizarre and probably incoherent non-deterministic meaning. In context, "correction" means "learning to choosing correctly as opposed to incorrectly", which is precisely what happens in this scenario. > However, choosing limited definitions, and restricting ourselves in comfortable contexts we can certainly avoid discomfort of the thought. I dispute this characterization. It's not "limited definitions" and "comfortable contexts" (presumably pejoratively), it's "appropriate definitions" and "relevant contexts". > but I see clearly why non-compatibilists say "word juggling" towards compatibilists. I think you'll find that the incompatibilists are just as guilty of this. They've spent centuries arguing for a definition of free will that no one actually holds. Philosophy is sometimes about drawing fine but relevant distinctions, and that's exactly what Compatibilism does: it carves out a fine line behind which we can make sense of holding intelligent learning agents responsible for their choices.
      - freshm087 8y ago
        They've spent centuries arguing for a definition of free will that no one actually holds This statement is incorrect, and actually prove the very thing you intended to deny. It's not like adherents of C. held a plebiscite, isn't it? (And if they would, I dare to say they would be in danger of huge disappointment.) They made a choice to call an action free when it's inescapable consequence of a butterfly flapping wings millenia ago on another continent, but not free if it's e.g. equally inescapable consequence of a another human doing something recently, and closely (even if this forcing person is equally inescapably forced by a butterfly wings before). It is not, however, some sort of obvious conclusion, accepted by everybody. It's something C. philosophers prefer to call a common sense, because... well because this way we can make sense of things we do. So it feels much better. As a side-note, your explanation of 'correction' makes perfect sense if you took the C. pill already, but doesn't make any useful proof of C. One have to accept that the only available variant of future (if we are in a purely determinist universe) still presents a free choice between correct/incorrect. Which is a circular reference to basic presumption of C. Anyway, thank you for taking time to write the long response!