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> It is not panicking or freaking out to err on the side of caution and ground flights. It can be, though. There is a risk inherent to air travel. The safest
by ncallaway 8y ago
> It is not panicking or freaking out to err on the side of caution and ground flights.
It can be, though.
There is a risk inherent to air travel. The safest thing to do would be to ground all flights of all aircraft permanently.
That wouldn't be prudent, though, because we can mitigate the risk until the benefit of air travel outweighs the risk of dying during air travel.
The prudent thing to do is to carefully evaluate the risks, and make a determination when the risks become too great.
- FartyMcFarter 8y agoA statistically unlikely pair of crashes or the same model of plane, same phase of flight, same consequences, and similar altitude variations would seem to be enough justification for a prudent grounding. If a company releases a new version of their software and it crashes twice in similar ways (much more frequently than the previous version), that is also enough reason to rollback the release and investigate, especially if the software has any critical use cases.
- snowwrestler 8y agoIf you release a software update and only 2 out of thousands of nodes are experiencing problems, would you honestly take the whole application offline over that? Most software companies would not, in my experience. They would take a close look at those two nodes first. Obviously commercial aviation has much higher standards than software vendors generally do. Airline tickets don’t generally come with 5,000 word EULAs with all-caps provisions like “THIS SOFTWARE IS NOT FIT FOR PURPOSE AND SHOULD NOT BE USED FOR ANY REASON AND YOU ASSUME ALL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ANY NEGATIVE OUTCOMES OF ANY KIND” etc. Two crashes in close succession seems like an obvious abnormality. But because standards are so high, to commercial aviation providers and regulators, every single crash is treated as a significant abnormality. So the question is, why don’t they ground all models of a certain plane after a single crash? Once you understand that, the same logic applies to two crashes.
- tayo42 8y agoThis doesn't really work, those 2 nodes of thousands have to kill a little over 300 people too when they go bad, when other software releases haven't killed people.
- dmichulke 8y agoThe first fallacy in this is that (as I understand it) you only think about probabilities, while in fact it's about probability (of something bad happening) times the cost of that bad thing. Clearly, a chance for a bug losing you 300$ is much less of a problem than a chance for a bug killing 300 people. The second thing is that a software update may render previous knowledge useless. Just because the old software ran successfully on 100k nodes, it might still be the case that 2 out of 1000 new versions fail, so then you have 0.2% failure rate. That doesn't mean you should take out all 100k nodes but it means you might want to stop the 1k nodes in accordance with the principles laid out above. Finally, I am not even sure why this is a yes/no question. How about: You're allowed to use the plane but you cannot rely on a defense of "the FAA said it was ok" if something happens, so talk to your insurance before.
- FartyMcFarter 8y agoYou're missing the point. It's not just about the fact that two crashes happened. It's that the crashes look suspiciously similar. So this is both statistically suspicious, and points at a possible common cause for the crash, making it even more worrying that there's something seriously broken in this design.
- atoav 8y agoRisk managment is not rational at all times. If you have a reasonable expectation that the risk has increased, doing nothing is far worse than crying wolf with good intentions. Especially if you are responsible for the consequences afterwards. Imagine the story would go like this: a girl heard the story about the boy who cried wolf. Uppon seeing a pack of wolves the girl doesn’t cry wolf because she wasn’t 100% sure that it wasn’t in fact a pack of stray dogs. Villagers die. The original story teaches kids not to lie to gain attention, because nobody will believe you when you for once have a serious risk at hand. It has nothing to do with how we should treat real risks, where we have real indicators of increased risk. Climate change is the ultimate example of such a risk. Better safe than sorry, because beeing sorry can easily become the end of the species here. Some airplane failing is arguably a tiny thing in comparison — but once you have been warned about a risk you can mitigate and you do nothing, you own it. Living is dangerous and everything has a remaining risk that stays dangerous even after any reasonable risk has been mitigated. But this isn’t about totally ruling out all remaining risks, it is about ruling out risks that are easy to rule out. If somebody told you the brakes of your bicycle are both broken, you would probably not lend it to someone until you convinced yourself of the condition of your brakes. You will do this despite the fact that cyling can be dangerous with a fully functional bicycle too.
- perl4ever 8y agoI think a shorter way to express the concept is that there are "known unknowns" - risks we can quantify, and "unknown unknowns" - risks we can't quantify. When people become aware of the possibility of the latter, they may panic. Of course, sometimes that proves to be the right decision and sometimes not. There is no "rational" solution.