3 ms·
> That's all assuming the voting machine is actually running the software/hardware they tell you - how would a voter check? Have dedicated hardware compute a h
by kevin_thibedeau 8y ago
> That's all assuming the voting machine is actually running the software/hardware they tell you - how would a voter check?
Have dedicated hardware compute a hash from the content of program ROM on demand with a button press and present it on an auxilliary 7-segment display. Compare against the hash of the vetted image. No software need be involved.
At some point in the process, machines will be used for tabulation. You have to trust the hardware to some extent. Just keep it as simple as possible to minimize confounding complexity that an attacker can hide in.
- deogeo 8y agoIf the compiler was compromised, how do you know the vetted image is correct? If the hardware was compromised, then the software will still hash to the correct value. And once the attacker knows where you're getting the dedicated hardware for the hash, he can compromise that as well. And the entire system relies on the people implementing it to not have been compromised. Because if they were, if the government itself compromised the machines, the voters could never tell. How good is a voting system that only works if your government is honest?
- zAy0LfpBZLC8mAC 8y ago> Have dedicated hardware compute a hash from the content of program ROM How do you check the circuit of that hardware? How do you know the ROM you are reading is the ROM the CPU is executing from? How do you know the CPU is the architecture you think it is and the program means what you think it means? > You have to trust the hardware to some extent. No, you don't, and you shouldn't. You can do all of that calculation by hand. And at the very least you can check a random selection by hand. > Just keep it as simple as possible to minimize confounding complexity that an attacker can hide in. In other words: Don't use electronics. You can't get simpler than pen and paper.