> the system rejected the data as invalid and temporarily stopped the stall warnings. However, "this led to a perverse reversal that lasted nearly to the impac

> the system rejected the data as invalid and temporarily stopped the stall warnings. However, "this led to a perverse reversal that lasted nearly to the impact: each time Bonin happened to lower the nose, rendering the angle of attack marginally less severe, the stall warning sounded again—a negative reinforcement that may have locked him into his pattern of pitching up", which increased the angle of attack and thus prevented the aircraft from getting out of its stall From your link. In my mind that is the critical piece. The pilot did the right thing, pushed the nose down, heard the stall warning again, and did the wrong thing, pulled the nose up, because that made the stall warning go away. Having been in a plane upside down at night pointed toward the ground I can imagine the stress on the crew. It’s easy to say dump the nose when the stall warning goes off, but what if they had been upside down, then he would have been doing the right thing by listening to the warning. The fact the stall warning cut off was the final critical link in the accident, not pilot error.