That is not accurate. There is a sufficiently different pitching moment in high angle of attack attitude that results in the engine nacelle producing lift. That

That is not accurate. There is a sufficiently different pitching moment in high angle of attack attitude that results in the engine nacelle producing lift. That means the flight characteristic of the MAX is sufficiently different to otherwise warrant its own type rating separate from previous 737 generation type rating. Boeing and FAA agreed to a software abstraction to obviate the need for a separate type rating for pilots. The plane is not unstable. A pilot who is trained for the actual flight characteristics absolutely can handle the plane. The problem is they weren't required to get that training, because 737's still all share the same type rating as if they all have substantially the same flight characteristics. Which is generally true except one particular attitude, high angle of attack. It's an open question to me (I'm no one, but I am a pilot and a flight instructor in a previous life) exactly how different stall avoidance could be with MCAS disabled (which is indirectly done by setting stabilizer trim to cutoff) once it has already induced a dive by having fought with it a little bit too long. If it's a normal procedure to disable the very software abstraction that means you don't need a type rating for this airplane, but the stall avoidance technique is substantially different from other 737s - that's very concerning to me. Not that the plane is unstable or unsafe. But that there's a disconnect in pilot knowledge and actual airplane flight characteristics with this abstraction turned off.