3 ms·
"It's the key exchange that's difficult." That's just the tip of the iceberg in difficulty. There's also: 0 - understanding the web of trust 1 - verifying t
by pmoriarty 8y ago
"It's the key exchange that's difficult."
That's just the tip of the iceberg in difficulty.
There's also:
0 - understanding the web of trust
1 - verifying that the key you exchanged actually belongs to the person/entity it purports to be from (ie. verifying identities of keyholders and verifying key fingerprints over an out-of-band communications channel).
2 - keeping your own secret keys secure
3 - making and keeping offline backups of your keys
4 - understanding why, how, and when to issue and use key revocations
- BeetleB 8y agoDo you need to understand any of that for SSL on the Web? What the person is proposing is comparable (albeit only in one direction). The user doesn't need to understand any of this. The user does not need to sign his emails. He just needs a mail software that can handle signatures from well known organizations, and can warn you when the signature doesn't match. Just like my browser puts a green or red symbol when there's a problem with the certificate. Everything you list is mostly orthogonal to the submission.
- freeone3000 8y agoSSL on the web verifies that the sender is who they've verified to a third party that they are. It does not verify that they're trustworthy in any way, shape, or form. What makes an organization "well-known" enough to be on this list? What happens if an organization is not on this list? What if I'm a completely-legitimate (S-Corp paperwork filed!) organization called amazorn.com? And what problem does this solve that the current DMARC system does not?
- jerf 8y agoFor this specific task, we can collapse a lot of that on the web. Adding a gpg key ring or some other suitable structure to the .well-known URL list [1] wouldn't be that big a deal. This is easier than solving the problem of securing all emails. For verifying signatures you don't need any keys of your own, so 2 & 3 are irrelevant, and the .well-known URL can have revocations in it too. But it's still plenty hard to ensure that we don't show an email as validated as definitely being from amazorn.com, along with some other funny business that could be pulled. It does tend to get the problem down to an already existing set of problems, though. It could also be the "killer app" for GPG emails. [1]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5785 https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5785