3 ms·

I wouldn't say it was picked at random when there is little information available. It seems to me like an application of the precautionary principle. In this ca

by La1n 8y ago

I wouldn't say it was picked at random when there is little information available. It seems to me like an application of the precautionary principle. In this case there is a plausible risk that the problem extents to other 737 MAX airplanes, and thus to prevent harm it's better to block the use until there is certainty about the situation. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Precautionary_principle https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Precautionary_principle

paulmd 8y ago
It's likely a (deliberate) training fault on the part of Boeing here. The new engines+nacelles change the handling characteristics of the aircraft and add a substantial pitch-up characteristic. Boeing wanted to brand this as a drop-in replacement for your existing 737 fleet requiring no additional re-training beyond normal ongoing certifications, so they added new systems to address this flight characteristic, and neglected to document this in their flight manuals or any of their training materials. The system activated erroneously in-flight and the pilots could not cancel a system they did not know existed. https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/u-s-pilots-flying-737-max-werent-told-about-new-automatic-systems-change-linked-to-lion-air-crash/ https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/u-s-p... https://outline.com/t78kad https://outline.com/t78kad https://youtu.be/zfQW0upkVus?t=220 https://youtu.be/zfQW0upkVus?t=220 There are other contributing factors here, there are apparently multiple failure conditions that can activate this system without appropriate degrees of redundancy (which is a design fault and will probably be rectified at some point), but the primary cause here is that Boeing suppressed information about this system's existence in an attempt to make their new aircraft more attractive compared to Airbus's alternatives. The aircraft itself is not faulty in the sense that it cannot be controlled when these failure conditions occur. Boeing was negligent in its training and marketing of these aircraft.

by La1n 8y ago

paulmd 8y ago

It's likely a (deliberate) training fault on the part of Boeing here. The new engines+nacelles change the handling characteristics of the aircraft and add a substantial pitch-up characteristic. Boeing wanted to brand this as a drop-in replacement for your existing 737 fleet requiring no additional re-training beyond normal ongoing certifications, so they added new systems to address this flight characteristic, and neglected to document this in their flight manuals or any of their training materials. The system activated erroneously in-flight and the pilots could not cancel a system they did not know existed. https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/u-s-pilots-flying-737-max-werent-told-about-new-automatic-systems-change-linked-to-lion-air-crash/ https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/u-s-p... https://outline.com/t78kad https://outline.com/t78kad https://youtu.be/zfQW0upkVus?t=220 https://youtu.be/zfQW0upkVus?t=220 There are other contributing factors here, there are apparently multiple failure conditions that can activate this system without appropriate degrees of redundancy (which is a design fault and will probably be rectified at some point), but the primary cause here is that Boeing suppressed information about this system's existence in an attempt to make their new aircraft more attractive compared to Airbus's alternatives. The aircraft itself is not faulty in the sense that it cannot be controlled when these failure conditions occur. Boeing was negligent in its training and marketing of these aircraft.