2 ms·
You seem very focused on the approach of just putting all the work in clients to detect things that are a problem and reject/ ignore them. But we do not like th
by tialaramex 8y ago
You seem very focused on the approach of just putting all the work in clients to detect things that are a problem and reject/ ignore them. But we do not like this because it's only ever one mistake away from no prevention at all and you can't tell by looking.
Better then to reject this whole "Let's give subCAs to random people to save them some work" approach altogether.
Can you trust that major CAs are doing a good job? Well, if you suspect that they aren't all the data is there to go look for yourself, please report anything untoward that you find to m.d.s.policy and/or the issuer.
For the final point - the problem is compatibility. We do not want to create myriad non-interoperable systems, that's why "the Internet" won in the first place. If not for the grave security problems with SHA1 (demonstrated collision for a relatively affordable sum of money) we'd be using that forever, even though newer hashes are nicer.
SHA3 in particular might never go anywhere. Its design (a sponge not another Merkle–Damgård construction like MD4, MD5, SHA1 and SHA2) has appealing properties such as preventing length extension attacks, but you can get many similar benefits from things like SHA512/256 (run SHA-512 but throw away bits to keep only 256 of them).
https://www.imperialviolet.org/2017/05/31/skipsha3.html https://www.imperialviolet.org/2017/05/31/skipsha3.html