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> I'm not going to go around spelunking on my old comments to prove to you that your attacks on me are unfounded. Do your own homework if you care about this fo

> I'm not going to go around spelunking on my old comments to prove to you that your attacks on me are unfounded. Do your own homework if you care about this for some reason but this is getting extremely aggressive for no reason. You're asking me to prove a negative. I merely said I doubted you knew about receipt freeness because you didn't even mention it as an obvious counterpoint to your claim, which is a reasonable conclusion. If you consider that an “extremely aggressive attack”, fine. It is easy for you to prove me wrong, you just have to point out the comment in question. In the meantime, I'll continue to assume you either had no idea what receipt freeness was, or deliberately created the false impression that a verifiable voting system cannot be receipt free. > I wasn't about to go 10 rounds of "but you could do X and then be broken by Y". You've failed to show that receipt freeness introduces something else that fundamentally "breaks" which wasn't in the original system, despite repeatedly claiming this is so (see also "They fix this issue and introduce others", a claim made with absolutely zero evidence). > So here's how I attack it if I'm just a skilled hacker working alone: So you just assume you can achieve all of this for any e-voting system. Fantastic argument. Really convincing. You may as well have said "Here's how I would attack and infiltrate banking networks or current voting systems surreptitiously. See, we can never trust either of these!" That's just laughable. > At the end there's a very high chance your election is now fully distrusted and the country is in chaos. Even if it doesn't work 100% of the time it only takes one or two successful events globally for people to distrust these systems, whichever they are. Clearly wrong as evinced by Estonia's voting system, even in the face of its demonstrated security flaws. > The scary thing about what I just described is that plenty of it is indistinguishable from what is already happening in some cases in US elections today. ...and it hasn't led to the collapse of the voting system. > If there are no advantages why do it? Are you asking what the advantages of e-voting are? > The difference for eCommerce and eBanking is that under any of those attack scenarios you just go to the bank branch and sort things out, including reverting transactions. You're assuming banks are always aware of attacks, which is just not true. > At this point it's on you. It's not "on me". It's been mathematically proven that a system can possess these properties simultaneously. For example, see https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-540-24691-6_19 https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-540-24691-6_... https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/11818175_22 https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/11818175_22

pedrocr 8y ago
This seems pointless but I'll clarify the main thing in case you really haven't understood my point. > You've failed to show that receipt freeness introduces something else that fundamentally "breaks" which wasn't in the original system, despite repeatedly claiming this is so (see also "They fix this issue and introduce others", a claim made with absolutely zero evidence). The issues that are introduced are exactly all that attack surface that I described how to exploit. You keep insisting that the math checks out but that's not in dispute. The mathematical properties of a well designed electronic system are fine. It's the actual engineering realities of such a system that makes it massively easier to exploit. All those examples I gave and many more are now failure modes you have and didn't before. > Are you asking what the advantages of e-voting are? Yes. I live in a country that has heavily invested in e-government but runs very efficient paper elections. I go in on a Sunday at my convenience and get the results for the whole country 2 or 3 hours after the polls close, extremely accurate predictions maybe an hour after. I know of no advantage electronic voting would bring that would be worth the extra cost, let alone the risk and complexity. It's a (very poor) solution looking for a problem.

pedrocr 8y ago

This seems pointless but I'll clarify the main thing in case you really haven't understood my point. > You've failed to show that receipt freeness introduces something else that fundamentally "breaks" which wasn't in the original system, despite repeatedly claiming this is so (see also "They fix this issue and introduce others", a claim made with absolutely zero evidence). The issues that are introduced are exactly all that attack surface that I described how to exploit. You keep insisting that the math checks out but that's not in dispute. The mathematical properties of a well designed electronic system are fine. It's the actual engineering realities of such a system that makes it massively easier to exploit. All those examples I gave and many more are now failure modes you have and didn't before. > Are you asking what the advantages of e-voting are? Yes. I live in a country that has heavily invested in e-government but runs very efficient paper elections. I go in on a Sunday at my convenience and get the results for the whole country 2 or 3 hours after the polls close, extremely accurate predictions maybe an hour after. I know of no advantage electronic voting would bring that would be worth the extra cost, let alone the risk and complexity. It's a (very poor) solution looking for a problem.