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>My main criticism is that as it is it could still feed the card with the wrong vote to sign. The (state-provided) USB reader should have a small lcd screen to

>My main criticism is that as it is it could still feed the card with the wrong vote to sign. The (state-provided) USB reader should have a small lcd screen to sum up the thing being signed "Vote for Ms.Ryjavik on election #123" "Vote for Yes on vote #432" and a confirmation button. You can check who you cast your vote for through online voting. You can do it 3 times for half an hour after you voting. You cast your vote on a PC and at the end the voting software shows you a QR code. You can then use an app on your phone provided by the government to check who your vote was counted for. Read more here: https://www.valimised.ee/en/internet-voting/checking-i-vote https://www.valimised.ee/en/internet-voting/checking-i-vote

isostatic 8y ago
So much for a secret ballot
- Mirioron 8y ago
  You can vote multiple times though and the previous votes are discarded. You can even show up on election day at the end and it well override your online vote.
eftpotrm 8y ago
You can check that the reporting app tells you that you voted for who you think you voted for. You have no way of asserting that that was the vote that was actually counted in the reported result.
- hopler 8y ago
  I don't know what Estonia does, but there are ways to publish the votes in a secure way that prevents anyone from decrypting a single vote, but lets anyone verify their vote was correctly counted using their own secret key. httpp://news.mit.edu/2009/rivest-voting Of course you need monitors from all interested parties to prevent ballot stuffing, but that's true in every election. It's up to monitors to read the voter list and verify that (probabilistically) there are no/few fake voters on it.
  - codedokode 8y ago
    According to this report [1], they published the source code and provided a video recording of installing the software (sounds like a joke): > Despite positive gestures towards transparency — such as releasing portions of the software as open source and posting many hours of videos documenting the configuration and tabulation steps — Estonia’s system fails to provide compelling proof that election outcomes are correct. Critical steps occur off camera, and potentially vulnerable portions of the software are not available for public inspection. [1] https://estoniaevoting.org/findings/summary/ https://estoniaevoting.org/findings/summary/

isostatic 8y ago

So much for a secret ballot

Mirioron 8y ago
You can vote multiple times though and the previous votes are discarded. You can even show up on election day at the end and it well override your online vote.

eftpotrm 8y ago

You can check that the reporting app tells you that you voted for who you think you voted for. You have no way of asserting that that was the vote that was actually counted in the reported result.

hopler 8y ago
I don't know what Estonia does, but there are ways to publish the votes in a secure way that prevents anyone from decrypting a single vote, but lets anyone verify their vote was correctly counted using their own secret key. httpp://news.mit.edu/2009/rivest-voting Of course you need monitors from all interested parties to prevent ballot stuffing, but that's true in every election. It's up to monitors to read the voter list and verify that (probabilistically) there are no/few fake voters on it.
- codedokode 8y ago
  According to this report [1], they published the source code and provided a video recording of installing the software (sounds like a joke): > Despite positive gestures towards transparency — such as releasing portions of the software as open source and posting many hours of videos documenting the configuration and tabulation steps — Estonia’s system fails to provide compelling proof that election outcomes are correct. Critical steps occur off camera, and potentially vulnerable portions of the software are not available for public inspection. [1] https://estoniaevoting.org/findings/summary/ https://estoniaevoting.org/findings/summary/