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> a smartcard, secured and provided by state officials [..] The (state-provided) USB reader [..] are not immune to attack either. Unless you go to the extraord

by deogeo 8y ago

> a smartcard, secured and provided by state officials [..] The (state-provided) USB reader [..] are not immune to attack either. Unless you go to the extraordinary lengths of making your own hardware in a facility you secure and keep secured for the duration of your democracy, there is no such thing as a 'secure device'. Not when the prize is something so hugely lucrative and advantageous as control over an entire country. All assuming you trust your government. With opposition parties monitoring vote counts, that's easy. But what about when they have to look for dopant-level chip defects?

Latteland 8y ago
In Washington state, all voting is via paper ballots mailed or dropped off at a voting location. You sign them. People end up having different ballots because your ballot is customized for the district you live in (unique city, school district, county, state combinations is a reasonable size). They verify your signature. You can track if you ballot was received (it's inside an inner envelope) and if your signature was confirmed or not. This feels safe, and as they have the original paper, they can revote - but they have all the ones in the district in a box somehow.
- ataturk 8y ago
  I lost any respect I had for WA after I-1639. The ballot initiative that never actually got enough signatures, but Michael Bloomberg's money ensured it got on the ballot anyways. You're making felons out of everyday people now. Who cares how great your voting is when you can't even follow the US Constitution? It's a joke, it's all just a sick joke now.
belorn 8y ago
Who create the security tokens that banks use? I could see few things more lucrative and advantageous than a perfect backdoor into that hardware, especially since here in Sweden you can create electronic government ID from said token which can be used for everything except voting. It is not without reason that most common fraud here in Sweden (around 80%) is someone calling under false pretense asking a victim to use the hardware token in order for the fraudsters to create a new electronic id which is then used to empty the bank account, create credit accounts, and so on. So far those security tokens has had a perfect track record from a hardware perspective, as much good that does. Maybe that is a bomb waiting to explode but it is hard to see a stronger incentives for criminals than what already exist. When people here discuss electronic voting, security of the hardware tokens is not usually brought up. It is rather all the other elements which makes it a bad choice. There would be no physical ballots that can be verified, questionable anonymity, and a loss of a controlled voting environment. All the common solutions to those problems usually results in the conclusion that it then easier to just keep the current system as is.
- dbdjfjrjvebd 8y ago
  The thing is that bank security is at least theoretically possible. Banks and/or governments act as a central sources of trust in such systems and trust for can be derived from this source. I.e. a bank could build the hardware tokens from scratch themselves. With an election the trust model is inverted. I'm not sure there is any practical way to allow the trust sources (every voter) to audit the hardware tokens.
  - kosievdmerwe 8y ago
    Also importantly, banks don't have to be anonymous. Every transaction has the identities of the people involved.
- hopler 8y ago
  Electronic votes can be secured cryptographically. Votes can be counted per precinct instead of centrally, and then summed. The security factors of paper voting can be replicated electronically. "The authority might just lie about the count or throw away or counterfeit votes, or coerce voters other vote a certain way" is not solved by paper voting either, as seen in Russia and many other places.

by deogeo 8y ago

Latteland 8y ago

In Washington state, all voting is via paper ballots mailed or dropped off at a voting location. You sign them. People end up having different ballots because your ballot is customized for the district you live in (unique city, school district, county, state combinations is a reasonable size). They verify your signature. You can track if you ballot was received (it's inside an inner envelope) and if your signature was confirmed or not. This feels safe, and as they have the original paper, they can revote - but they have all the ones in the district in a box somehow.

ataturk 8y ago
I lost any respect I had for WA after I-1639. The ballot initiative that never actually got enough signatures, but Michael Bloomberg's money ensured it got on the ballot anyways. You're making felons out of everyday people now. Who cares how great your voting is when you can't even follow the US Constitution? It's a joke, it's all just a sick joke now.

belorn 8y ago

Who create the security tokens that banks use? I could see few things more lucrative and advantageous than a perfect backdoor into that hardware, especially since here in Sweden you can create electronic government ID from said token which can be used for everything except voting. It is not without reason that most common fraud here in Sweden (around 80%) is someone calling under false pretense asking a victim to use the hardware token in order for the fraudsters to create a new electronic id which is then used to empty the bank account, create credit accounts, and so on. So far those security tokens has had a perfect track record from a hardware perspective, as much good that does. Maybe that is a bomb waiting to explode but it is hard to see a stronger incentives for criminals than what already exist. When people here discuss electronic voting, security of the hardware tokens is not usually brought up. It is rather all the other elements which makes it a bad choice. There would be no physical ballots that can be verified, questionable anonymity, and a loss of a controlled voting environment. All the common solutions to those problems usually results in the conclusion that it then easier to just keep the current system as is.

dbdjfjrjvebd 8y ago
The thing is that bank security is at least theoretically possible. Banks and/or governments act as a central sources of trust in such systems and trust for can be derived from this source. I.e. a bank could build the hardware tokens from scratch themselves. With an election the trust model is inverted. I'm not sure there is any practical way to allow the trust sources (every voter) to audit the hardware tokens.
- kosievdmerwe 8y ago
  Also importantly, banks don't have to be anonymous. Every transaction has the identities of the people involved.
hopler 8y ago
Electronic votes can be secured cryptographically. Votes can be counted per precinct instead of centrally, and then summed. The security factors of paper voting can be replicated electronically. "The authority might just lie about the count or throw away or counterfeit votes, or coerce voters other vote a certain way" is not solved by paper voting either, as seen in Russia and many other places.