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I know you read my comment here ( http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=1935284 http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=1935284 ) because you replied to it before wri
by jodrellblank 16y ago
I know you read my comment here ( http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=1935284 http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=1935284 ) because you replied to it before writing this comment. Yet you still talk about "invasive wiping of personal data on a personal phone" as if someone somewhere wrote
if (RemoteWipe) {
companyData.Erase();
personalData.Erase();
}
Do you understand that the iPhone does not keep personal and company data separate? Do you agree that the distinction between personal and company is vague and human defined?
What kind of high-end security hardware are you talking about? If you used an advanced Cisco software VPN client, you could (so I hear) have it scan the client computer and enforce policies on it. If it was used on a personal computer, these would be invasive in a similar way yet you would not blame Cisco or the company if the user didn't understand this, would you? Would you be outraged that it's even technically possible?
- Silhouette 16y ago> Do you understand that the iPhone does not keep personal and company data separate? Yes, of course. I just think it's the employer's problem in this case, not the employee's. > Do you agree that the distinction between personal and company is vague and human defined? No. The argument made by many people disagreeing with me in this discussion is predicated on the employee downloading data from the company Exchange system. That provides an objective standard for what constitutes "company data". If you're going to try to broaden that in some ill-defined way to any other data the employee has, you might as well argue that any employer should have the right to audit any and all of an employee's personal property, communications or brainwaves. I am aware that some employers actually do seem to think that at least the first two are reasonable, but I vehemently disagree with them, and so does the law in most places. > What kind of high-end security hardware are you talking about? The relevant ones here typically record/block/modify network traffic: intrusion detection, data leakage prevention, lawful intercept, that kind of thing. > If you used an advanced Cisco software VPN client, you could (so I hear) have it scan the client computer and enforce policies on it. If it was used on a personal computer, these would be invasive in a similar way yet you would not blame Cisco or the company if the user didn't understand this, would you? You mean if (a) an employee was asked to work from home, (b) the employee was asked to access the company network using company-provided software installed on their personal computer (the VPN client), and (c) that software then reformatted the employee's hard drive because someone in corporate IT hit the wrong button by accident, would I have the same problem with it? Yes, of course. As I keep saying, if the company requires that kind of control, it should be issuing employees with dedicated systems at company expense, configured appropriately. I struggle to see any circumstances under which installing software on an employee's personal property that gives the employer the ability to wipe the entire machine arbitrarily would ever be justified.
- tptacek 16y agoExactly how does a DLP system help a company whose employees are allowed to use iPhones for company mail, when company mail is streaked through with protected information like bacon is with pig fat? People put network DLP systems on their perimeters, so they can catch data walking out the front door. Protected information is supposed to walk over email; people use it to get their jobs done.
- Silhouette 16y ago> Exactly how does a DLP system help a company whose employees are allowed to use iPhones for company mail, when company mail is streaked through with protected information like bacon is with pig fat? Exactly, it doesn't! If you have data that is important enough for leakage control at the edge of your network, then it must not be accessible outside of your controlled systems at all. An employee's personal phone is never a controlled system for the purposes of this policy. After all, what if the phone isn't stolen, but infected by a data-stealing virus during the employee's personal use?
- tptacek 16y agoThis is called a "risk". Companies do different things in response to different risks. To the "company will lose $100MM if one of 150 different people lose their phone" risk, many companies have adopted the "nuke from orbit" control. To the "phones may be infected by data-stealing viruses" risk, most companies have adopted the "qualified stake holder for affected data has signed a document attesting to the company's acceptance of that risk". If companies had the black-and-white perspective on risk you have here, nobody would ever be able to deploy a line of code.
- Silhouette 16y agoI don't have a black-and-white perspective on risk, but either the data is worth protecting at a remote-wipe kind of level or it's not. In most cases, the ability to wipe a typical employee's personal phone in response to anything would be a ludicrous over-reaction. On the other hand, if you have someone who really does need to access sensitive data on their phone, and leaking that data is a $100,000,000 kind of risk, and there is $100,000s of layered security that normally protects that data, then maybe company IT should be authorised to spend $100s on a properly secured device that they can remote wipe if necessary, in preference to giving an obvious attack vector straight past that security. As you say, it's about the risk. I don't see any circumstances under which risking using an employee's personal phone to access genuinely sensitive data off-network is justified. Either the damage if it leaks is bad, in which case the barrier for providing a company phone is pretty low, or the damage is negligible, in which case requiring a remote wipe facility that can destroy the employee's own property is silly.