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>> Not being able to do something properly is not an excuse for doing it badly > Yes it really is. I don't really know what I can say to this post. You have s
by Silhouette 16y ago
>> Not being able to do something properly is not an excuse for doing it badly
> Yes it really is.
I don't really know what I can say to this post. You have somehow turned this whole incident into the victim's fault, mitigating the consequences of the company IT staff's mistake into the victim's responsibility, and my argument that it is not reasonable for an employer to introduce such a drastic facility to destroy an employee's personal property without giving the employee fair warning into some unbounded "no-one should be responsible for anything" argument. We live in two different universes.
- jodrellblank 16y agoI haven't turned it ino that, I see it as that - apart from the fault bit. Nobody is at fault. The user didn't understand, the phone and email system isn't perfect, the IT staff made a mistake. These things happen. It doesn't need government legislation, lawyers and compensation. Shit happens. What do we do differently in future? We could try educating people about IT, but people don't care about IT. We could try legislation, but that costs time and money and makes life less pleasant. We could try not getting upset when everything isn't perfect and ideal. That helps. What makes you think the employee didn't get fair warning?
- Silhouette 16y ago> Nobody is at fault. ?! The corporate IT people screwed up and issued a data-loss command they apparently had neither reason nor authorisation to issue. Someone's personal property was completely wiped as a result. We don't know how much valuable personal data was on that phone, but it could have held e-mails, photographs, etc. They could have been important, have great sentimental value, even have been evidence in a legal action (e.g., photos taken after a road accident). In any case, this is clear cut negligence. The phone wipe might not have been deliberate, but the damage was done and it is absolutely clear who was at fault. > What makes you think the employee didn't get fair warning? Well, for one thing, this: "It was my account, in my name [and] I'd paid all the bills," Stanton says. "It didn't make any sense to me that somehow work could get through AT&T, who I thought controlled my phone, and could completely disable the phone and the account." Does that sound like the employee was properly informed to you?
- jodrellblank 16y agoWe don't know how much valuable personal data was on that phone, but it could have held e-mails, photographs, etc. They could have been important Then they should have a backup. In any case, this is clear cut negligence ?! Unless you want a world where every employee's every mouse click is monitored by another employee and everything takes two people, three times as long and costs four times as much in auditing you have to accept that accidents are not the same as negligence. Remote wipe is a web interface. Assuming the IT staff was supposed to wipe a different device, they either misread or misremembered the ID or misclicked (or were misinformed). One click. If you put your life on the line where one click can destroy it and you have no backup, and you still connect your device to systems you don't understand, you're running a huge risk and no amount of legislation will ever help you. Does that sound like the employee was properly informed to you? It sounds like someone who doesn't know how something works. They could well be someone who had it explained, agreed, then forgot. Or wasn't listening, or didn't care. Lots of people do that. Like the executives in your other comment who sat through a security presentation and then moments later showed they hadn't understood it at all on a conference call.
- Silhouette 16y ago> Then they should have a backup. That would be the part where you turned mitigating the IT guy's screw-up into the victim's responsibility again. > Assuming the IT staff was supposed to wipe a different device, they either misread or misremembered the ID or misclicked (or were misinformed). One click. If you have a system that can do that much damage because of a single missed click, then it's not just negligence, it's gross negligence. > If you put your life on the line where one click can destroy it and you have no backup, and you still connect your device to systems you don't understand If you don't understand the system, how are you supposed to know that one click can do this? It's clear from the article that the victim in this case didn't understand that it was possible at all. > They could well be someone who had it explained, agreed, then forgot. Seriously? You think that an employee was told, clearly and unambiguously, that by connecting their phone up to work e-mail they ran the risk of having their entire phone wiped including all of their non-work-related stuff at any time just because someone missed a single mouse click over in IT, and they forgot this? If the discussions about this article everywhere I read other than HN are at all representative, most employees given a clear explanation of this policy would have immediately turned around and told corporate IT to shove it, demanding a company phone to use instead of allowing their personal one anywhere near such a system.
- LurkingGrue 16y agoIf I had a penny for every user that ignored important facts about IT I could retire.
- Silhouette 16y agoWe had a great IT security presentation at a medium-sized company I used to work for once, one of those annual "click through all the slides so we know you've read it" things that US companies seem to love. As I understand it, the material was put together by an outside team of expert security consultants, who came in and audited the company's usual policies and the access requirements for people to do their jobs sensibly. The executives watched the presentation and concluded that this was great, because now all of their staff would know not to leave CDs with sensitive data lying around on their desks when they went home. The front-line grunts -- who were mostly geeks, this being a software company -- concluded that more than 98% of the recorded data leakage incidents in this 5,000 person company, and 100% of the serious ones, would have been prevented by (a) refusing to exempt senior/executive management from the corporate IT security policies that applied to all other staff and (b) requiring sales people only to use company laptops with the standard security software installed and maintained by corporate IT when going off-site. (I'm pretty sure that I really am remembering the statistics here accurately, BTW. Listening to the executives on the conference call after watching the presentation was the kind of bang-head-on-wall moment you don't quickly forget.)