4 ms·
And if you just rely on the default trust stores you’re actually introducing over 100 third parties, some of which are known to be controlled by (or at least wo
by mmalone 8y ago
And if you just rely on the default trust stores you’re actually introducing over 100 third parties, some of which are known to be controlled by (or at least work with) the NSA, China, etc.
- ec109685 8y agoWith certificate pinning, that is not a high risk.
- mmalone 8y agoIf you’re talking about services that you’re accessing via a browser, true. If you actually do pinning (properly). For service-to-service stuff and APIs the number of TLS clients that respect pinning is approximately zero. Either way, the other problems remain, and running an internal PKI is really pretty easy.
- Thorrez 8y agoVery few sites use certificate pinning. Chrome dropped support for dynamic certificate pinning. Web based certificate pinning is often recommended against because it's very hard to do right. Also, using Let's Encrypt doesn't stop you from certificate pinning.
- tatersolid 8y agoCertificate pinning (HPKP) is browsers is effectively dead, and was never a good idea to begin with. There are far too many ways to self-DoS accidentally with HPKP. Also, an attacker who briefly gains control of your public DNS or web server can DoS a hostname semi-permanently.