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I find that the intuitive idea of free will doesn't make all that much sense anyway. Leave aside the discussion of whether people have free will in this univers

by jules 8y ago

I find that the intuitive idea of free will doesn't make all that much sense anyway. Leave aside the discussion of whether people have free will in this universe, how would a universe in which people actually have what most people call free free will even work?

pault 8y ago
Assuming that "free will" doesn't include manipulating the laws of physics, pretty much like the one we live in? I can see where people are coming from when they say there is no such thing as free will, but it sounds like they are saying the no one has the ability to consciously override their impulses. I don't smash the skull of everyone that makes me angry, for example.
- justanotherjoe 8y ago
  the danger is ascribing too much agency to a person's actions. We are all a product of circumstances. Instead of saying "You're lazy!", it's more productive to increase their living conditions.
  - naasking 8y ago
    I think your response often conflates two things: it's correct to classify a lazy person as lazy, but a diagnosis is not a treatment. For instance, diagnosing someone with a sprained muscle as being out of shape doesn't help get them in shape, and in fact, the immediate treatment is more rest until they're healed. So I think it's incorrect to say that people don't have agency, but it's equally incorrect to say that merely identifying that they have agency should suffice if such a person is making incorrect decisions. Sometimes it might, but not always.
    - deleted 8y ago
      [deleted]
- demiurgical 8y ago
  but why is bifurcation required? is the one stopping the impulses any different than the impulses engine? the reason you don't smash all of the skulls is as causal and determined as the impulses afaict. to me it seems that life is just sufficiently complex self contained units that are completely bound by deterministic laws. we have a sense of self referential capalbility which may give the illusion of free will but I'd say that it's not your decision to stop the impulses of smashing skulls rather it is the inescapable result of your unique determined state or rather process that your brain has been configure d for based on life experience and genes.
  - naasking 8y ago
    You're assuming free will is mutually exclusive with determinism. This is probably not the case. See Compatibilism, which enjoys majority support among philosophers and studies of lay people.
    - posterboy 8y ago
      This works as an assumption, and is rather useless in practice, because we cannot determine the deterministic state to its full extent, even in thought experiment, without limiting the degrees of freedom converging to zero, to then say, well I had free will after all, when I didn't know any better. I really don't get it. I mean, support for Compatibalism is in effect not the support of determinism that it claims to be. It's just an effort of philosophers to safe free will, out of free will, which means, to me, out of ignorance. So the only real insight is that we are sufficiently ignorant. How is that still sold as a positive thing? That still didn't come out right. I was trying to say, that Compatibilism is a meta argument. If it isn't then because it determined free will as a deterministic fact. I understand that philosophy is rather complicated, and at the very least I doubt that, if Compatibilism is true, that many people understand it sufficiently to be in the position to support it, other than as an educated guess.
      - naasking 8y ago
        I think the problem is that most people misunderstand philosophical inquiry. The free will debate is about defining what free will means such that it can serve as one factor to ground moral responsibility and how we employ our moral reasoning. Long ago, some philosophers suggested that we cannot be held morally responsible for factors that our outside of our control, and further, that any effects that follow from factors outside of our control, are thus also outside of our control. Determinism is the quintessential example. Numerous arguments have since been presented that debunk this need for control, the ability to do otherwise, etc. These properties simply aren't necessary for moral responsibility. Furthermore, studies in experimental philosophy have shown that lay people actually employ Compatibilist moral reasoning, debunking the long held assumption that people are incompatibilists because of religious upbringing. So I disagree that Compatibilism is some sort of meta-argument, as it fits squarely in the expected domain of discourse for free will. It is precisely fulfilling the philosophical research program of identifying that which is necessary to make sense of choice in our moral language.
cortic 8y ago
It wouldn't, free will has to be a product of Newtonian cause and effect or quantum randomness, neither of these things i define as 'me'. Even adding a soul wouldn't help, i imagined a soul existing in another universe affecting this one; same problem, just 1 universe over, cause and effect or random is still not 'me'. I think the only way to square any version of free will is to radically redefine what the term 'me' means.
- naasking 8y ago
  > I think the only way to square any version of free will is to radically redefine what the term 'me' means. The problem is that you're employing an incoherent or invalid conception of free will. Free will can be compatible with determinism, eg. Compatibilism.
  - cortic 8y ago
    >Compatibilism(from Wikipedia); They define free will as freedom to act according to one's motives without arbitrary hindrance from other individuals or institutions. This only works if we radically redefine the term "one's motives". Which isn't different from redefining what 'me' means. The problem is of course that in a Newtonian universe one's motives is a result of arbitrary past actions outwith our current definition of one's motives. And in a quantum universe one's motives are arbitrary (randomly) generated outwith our current definition of one's motives.
    - naasking 8y ago
      > The problem is of course that in a Newtonian universe one's motives is a result of arbitrary past actions outwith our current definition of one's motives. And in a quantum universe one's motives are arbitrary (randomly) generated outwith our current definition of one's motives. Fortunately, that's not a problem at all for free will and moral responsibility! That's why Compatibilism is now the prevailing paradigm.
      - cortic 8y ago

by jules 8y ago

pault 8y ago

Assuming that "free will" doesn't include manipulating the laws of physics, pretty much like the one we live in? I can see where people are coming from when they say there is no such thing as free will, but it sounds like they are saying the no one has the ability to consciously override their impulses. I don't smash the skull of everyone that makes me angry, for example.

justanotherjoe 8y ago
the danger is ascribing too much agency to a person's actions. We are all a product of circumstances. Instead of saying "You're lazy!", it's more productive to increase their living conditions.
- naasking 8y ago
  I think your response often conflates two things: it's correct to classify a lazy person as lazy, but a diagnosis is not a treatment. For instance, diagnosing someone with a sprained muscle as being out of shape doesn't help get them in shape, and in fact, the immediate treatment is more rest until they're healed. So I think it's incorrect to say that people don't have agency, but it's equally incorrect to say that merely identifying that they have agency should suffice if such a person is making incorrect decisions. Sometimes it might, but not always.
  - deleted 8y ago
    [deleted]
demiurgical 8y ago
but why is bifurcation required? is the one stopping the impulses any different than the impulses engine? the reason you don't smash all of the skulls is as causal and determined as the impulses afaict. to me it seems that life is just sufficiently complex self contained units that are completely bound by deterministic laws. we have a sense of self referential capalbility which may give the illusion of free will but I'd say that it's not your decision to stop the impulses of smashing skulls rather it is the inescapable result of your unique determined state or rather process that your brain has been configure d for based on life experience and genes.
- naasking 8y ago
  You're assuming free will is mutually exclusive with determinism. This is probably not the case. See Compatibilism, which enjoys majority support among philosophers and studies of lay people.
  - posterboy 8y ago
    This works as an assumption, and is rather useless in practice, because we cannot determine the deterministic state to its full extent, even in thought experiment, without limiting the degrees of freedom converging to zero, to then say, well I had free will after all, when I didn't know any better. I really don't get it. I mean, support for Compatibalism is in effect not the support of determinism that it claims to be. It's just an effort of philosophers to safe free will, out of free will, which means, to me, out of ignorance. So the only real insight is that we are sufficiently ignorant. How is that still sold as a positive thing? That still didn't come out right. I was trying to say, that Compatibilism is a meta argument. If it isn't then because it determined free will as a deterministic fact. I understand that philosophy is rather complicated, and at the very least I doubt that, if Compatibilism is true, that many people understand it sufficiently to be in the position to support it, other than as an educated guess.
    - naasking 8y ago
      I think the problem is that most people misunderstand philosophical inquiry. The free will debate is about defining what free will means such that it can serve as one factor to ground moral responsibility and how we employ our moral reasoning. Long ago, some philosophers suggested that we cannot be held morally responsible for factors that our outside of our control, and further, that any effects that follow from factors outside of our control, are thus also outside of our control. Determinism is the quintessential example. Numerous arguments have since been presented that debunk this need for control, the ability to do otherwise, etc. These properties simply aren't necessary for moral responsibility. Furthermore, studies in experimental philosophy have shown that lay people actually employ Compatibilist moral reasoning, debunking the long held assumption that people are incompatibilists because of religious upbringing. So I disagree that Compatibilism is some sort of meta-argument, as it fits squarely in the expected domain of discourse for free will. It is precisely fulfilling the philosophical research program of identifying that which is necessary to make sense of choice in our moral language.

cortic 8y ago

It wouldn't, free will has to be a product of Newtonian cause and effect or quantum randomness, neither of these things i define as 'me'. Even adding a soul wouldn't help, i imagined a soul existing in another universe affecting this one; same problem, just 1 universe over, cause and effect or random is still not 'me'. I think the only way to square any version of free will is to radically redefine what the term 'me' means.

naasking 8y ago
> I think the only way to square any version of free will is to radically redefine what the term 'me' means. The problem is that you're employing an incoherent or invalid conception of free will. Free will can be compatible with determinism, eg. Compatibilism.
- cortic 8y ago
  >Compatibilism(from Wikipedia); They define free will as freedom to act according to one's motives without arbitrary hindrance from other individuals or institutions. This only works if we radically redefine the term "one's motives". Which isn't different from redefining what 'me' means. The problem is of course that in a Newtonian universe one's motives is a result of arbitrary past actions outwith our current definition of one's motives. And in a quantum universe one's motives are arbitrary (randomly) generated outwith our current definition of one's motives.
  - naasking 8y ago
    > The problem is of course that in a Newtonian universe one's motives is a result of arbitrary past actions outwith our current definition of one's motives. And in a quantum universe one's motives are arbitrary (randomly) generated outwith our current definition of one's motives. Fortunately, that's not a problem at all for free will and moral responsibility! That's why Compatibilism is now the prevailing paradigm.
    - cortic 8y ago