> This article doesn’t support your original claim at all. Could Fannie’s officers really have been accurately disclosing the risks the firm was taking sho

> This article doesn’t support your original claim at all. Could Fannie’s officers really have been accurately disclosing the risks the firm was taking shortly before its sudden collapse? It is here where the case got complicated. While he was chief executive, Mr. Mudd said that subprime mortgages accounted for about 2 percent or less of the mortgages Fannie Mae was insuring. The commission’s case largely rested on the fact that this percentage did not include the insurer’s longstanding programs for low-credit score borrowers, Expanded Approval and MyCommunityMortgage. The theory about the Alt-A loan disclosures was also not that Fannie had not disclosed that it was in the business. It classified a number of its loans as Alt-A, and told investors as much. But it did not disclose that it had instructed lenders not to classify certain other loans as Alt-A, even though they were also supported by low documentation. ... The 2008 crisis definitely involved some sort of fudging or failure to disclose. But it also involved failure to see systemic risks building.