> And you're talking about zero improvement in security stance. Rotatable consumer keys. Mitigating the danger of vendor hacks/leaks. Both at the main problems

> And you're talking about zero improvement in security stance. Rotatable consumer keys. Mitigating the danger of vendor hacks/leaks. Both at the main problems with SSNs today. > You could literally implement your idea by just making it illegal to store SSNs, because that's the only salient point where you've improved over current state. SSNs cannot be rotated. SSNs have already leaked. Stealing an SSN allows you to open accounts/credit/etc neither of which my proposal allows. I'm wondering if you've even read my proposal. Either you haven't or you're pretending you haven't, in either case it seems bad faith. > It asks for what's on the card. Also print on the card to not give the card or the number on it to anyone. So this card of yours is identical to existing SSNs. SSN cards even contain that exact text. You need to go back to the drawing board (or just read my proposal and think about it a little). > Physical tokens are a "something you have". So now we're back to spending billions on physical tokens? How are you funding it. > My proposal is literally the same mechanism by which OpenID and web tokens work... OpenID won't scale to half a billion people, it isn't affordable or practical. Something you've already conceded, that's why you're talking about calling a phone number using your SSN-v2 secret. > And I'm done because I don't know how to work with someone who's idea of a good security posture is give away secrets to people who ask for them. We're on the tenth post and you still haven't even read my proposal, that isn't something in it, and you'd know that if you had taken the time to read it. You really aren't discussing in good faith here.