3 ms·

I'm suggesting a system where you prove that you know a secret by exchanging a token. You're proposing a system where you prove you know a secret by telling ev

I'm suggesting a system where you prove that you know a secret by exchanging a token. You're proposing a system where you prove you know a secret by telling everyone who asks you for it and hope they forget it later. (And somehow think that this is a workable long-term system that resolves the problems of the values we have now which work exactly the same way...) There's nothing about the former system that requires the things you are stuck on. (And I honestly think you're just being stubborn for some reason, because I'm pretty sure you understand the idea I'm conveying.) You could do it over the phone using a touch-tone system. You could do it through a website. You could do it with an app. You could do it with a hard or soft token. You could do it with a smartcard. The only requirement is that you are capable of telling your secret to the central authority in exchange for a token, in a way that it is very difficult for others to observe. Or, alternatively, to have come to an agreement about how to generate such tokens offline. But the important part is that in the system I'm talking about, you get a secret value from a central authority. And then you don't tell anyone that secret except that same central authority. Everyone else sees temporary values that are useless if saved -- no pinky promises and laws required.

Someone1234 8y ago
> And I honestly think you're just being stubborn for some reason, because I'm pretty sure you understand the idea I'm conveying. Indeed I do, it is logistically absurd. I'm talking about replacing one piece of cardboard with a different, more secure, piece of cardboard that resolves actual problems we have today. You're talking about smartphones, tokens, calling in, and a million other complex workarounds all in the name of hypothetical security. I'd love to see you try to explain your system to an elderly or disabled person. I can explain mine: "Instead of giving them your SSN card, give them this card instead." Done. One sentence. That's literally all they have to know. Plus your scheme has a huge hole. The second you moved away from physical tokens (which you now seem to acknowledge is unaffordable) to smartphones and now regular phones, you need a way to authenticate who you are. Which means you'll be giving people credentials, which can then be lost, stolen, or requested from vendors creating exactly the same issues we started with. In other words you've managed to create an expensive logistical nightmare that the general public will hate all in the name of hypothetical security benefits that won't even work in practice. Neat.
- jdmichal 8y ago
  > Indeed I do, it is logistically absurd. I'm talking about replacing one piece of cardboard with a different, more secure, piece of cardboard that resolves actual problems we have today. You're talking about smartphones, tokens, calling in, and a million other complex workarounds all in the name of hypothetical security. And you're talking about zero improvement in security stance. You could literally implement your idea by just making it illegal to store SSNs, because that's the only salient point where you've improved over current state. > I'd love to see you try to explain your system to an elderly or disabled person. I can explain mine: "Instead of giving them your SSN card, give them this card instead." Done. One sentence. That's literally all they have to know. Print card with secret. Give them card. Card has phone number on it. Call the number. It asks for what's on the card. You enter it. You get another number. Give that to the person asking. Also print on the card to not give the card or the number on it to anyone. > Plus your scheme has a huge hole. The second you moved away from physical tokens (which you now seem to acknowledge is unaffordable) to smartphones and now regular phones, you need a way to authenticate who you are. Which means you'll be giving people credentials, which can then be lost, stolen, or requested from vendors creating exactly the same issues we started with. Physical tokens are a "something you have". So is a piece of cardboard. If there's no need to authenticate a hardware token, there's also no need to authenticate a number on a piece of cardboard. And there's no reduction in security stance by doing so. Also, I make no acknowledgement of the in-/affordability of tokens. Rather, I assert that you can simultaneously support multi-modal methods of exchanging a secret for a token. > In other words you've managed to create an expensive logistical nightmare that the general public will hate all in the name of hypothetical security benefits that won't even work in practice. Neat. Really? My proposal is literally the same mechanism by which OpenID and web tokens work... And I'm done because I don't know how to work with someone who's idea of a good security posture is give away secrets to people who ask for them.
  - Someone1234 8y ago
    > And you're talking about zero improvement in security stance. Rotatable consumer keys. Mitigating the danger of vendor hacks/leaks. Both at the main problems with SSNs today. > You could literally implement your idea by just making it illegal to store SSNs, because that's the only salient point where you've improved over current state. SSNs cannot be rotated. SSNs have already leaked. Stealing an SSN allows you to open accounts/credit/etc neither of which my proposal allows. I'm wondering if you've even read my proposal. Either you haven't or you're pretending you haven't, in either case it seems bad faith. > It asks for what's on the card. Also print on the card to not give the card or the number on it to anyone. So this card of yours is identical to existing SSNs. SSN cards even contain that exact text. You need to go back to the drawing board (or just read my proposal and think about it a little). > Physical tokens are a "something you have". So now we're back to spending billions on physical tokens? How are you funding it. > My proposal is literally the same mechanism by which OpenID and web tokens work... OpenID won't scale to half a billion people, it isn't affordable or practical. Something you've already conceded, that's why you're talking about calling a phone number using your SSN-v2 secret. > And I'm done because I don't know how to work with someone who's idea of a good security posture is give away secrets to people who ask for them. We're on the tenth post and you still haven't even read my proposal, that isn't something in it, and you'd know that if you had taken the time to read it. You really aren't discussing in good faith here.

Someone1234 8y ago

> And I honestly think you're just being stubborn for some reason, because I'm pretty sure you understand the idea I'm conveying. Indeed I do, it is logistically absurd. I'm talking about replacing one piece of cardboard with a different, more secure, piece of cardboard that resolves actual problems we have today. You're talking about smartphones, tokens, calling in, and a million other complex workarounds all in the name of hypothetical security. I'd love to see you try to explain your system to an elderly or disabled person. I can explain mine: "Instead of giving them your SSN card, give them this card instead." Done. One sentence. That's literally all they have to know. Plus your scheme has a huge hole. The second you moved away from physical tokens (which you now seem to acknowledge is unaffordable) to smartphones and now regular phones, you need a way to authenticate who you are. Which means you'll be giving people credentials, which can then be lost, stolen, or requested from vendors creating exactly the same issues we started with. In other words you've managed to create an expensive logistical nightmare that the general public will hate all in the name of hypothetical security benefits that won't even work in practice. Neat.

jdmichal 8y ago
> Indeed I do, it is logistically absurd. I'm talking about replacing one piece of cardboard with a different, more secure, piece of cardboard that resolves actual problems we have today. You're talking about smartphones, tokens, calling in, and a million other complex workarounds all in the name of hypothetical security. And you're talking about zero improvement in security stance. You could literally implement your idea by just making it illegal to store SSNs, because that's the only salient point where you've improved over current state. > I'd love to see you try to explain your system to an elderly or disabled person. I can explain mine: "Instead of giving them your SSN card, give them this card instead." Done. One sentence. That's literally all they have to know. Print card with secret. Give them card. Card has phone number on it. Call the number. It asks for what's on the card. You enter it. You get another number. Give that to the person asking. Also print on the card to not give the card or the number on it to anyone. > Plus your scheme has a huge hole. The second you moved away from physical tokens (which you now seem to acknowledge is unaffordable) to smartphones and now regular phones, you need a way to authenticate who you are. Which means you'll be giving people credentials, which can then be lost, stolen, or requested from vendors creating exactly the same issues we started with. Physical tokens are a "something you have". So is a piece of cardboard. If there's no need to authenticate a hardware token, there's also no need to authenticate a number on a piece of cardboard. And there's no reduction in security stance by doing so. Also, I make no acknowledgement of the in-/affordability of tokens. Rather, I assert that you can simultaneously support multi-modal methods of exchanging a secret for a token. > In other words you've managed to create an expensive logistical nightmare that the general public will hate all in the name of hypothetical security benefits that won't even work in practice. Neat. Really? My proposal is literally the same mechanism by which OpenID and web tokens work... And I'm done because I don't know how to work with someone who's idea of a good security posture is give away secrets to people who ask for them.
- Someone1234 8y ago
  > And you're talking about zero improvement in security stance. Rotatable consumer keys. Mitigating the danger of vendor hacks/leaks. Both at the main problems with SSNs today. > You could literally implement your idea by just making it illegal to store SSNs, because that's the only salient point where you've improved over current state. SSNs cannot be rotated. SSNs have already leaked. Stealing an SSN allows you to open accounts/credit/etc neither of which my proposal allows. I'm wondering if you've even read my proposal. Either you haven't or you're pretending you haven't, in either case it seems bad faith. > It asks for what's on the card. Also print on the card to not give the card or the number on it to anyone. So this card of yours is identical to existing SSNs. SSN cards even contain that exact text. You need to go back to the drawing board (or just read my proposal and think about it a little). > Physical tokens are a "something you have". So now we're back to spending billions on physical tokens? How are you funding it. > My proposal is literally the same mechanism by which OpenID and web tokens work... OpenID won't scale to half a billion people, it isn't affordable or practical. Something you've already conceded, that's why you're talking about calling a phone number using your SSN-v2 secret. > And I'm done because I don't know how to work with someone who's idea of a good security posture is give away secrets to people who ask for them. We're on the tenth post and you still haven't even read my proposal, that isn't something in it, and you'd know that if you had taken the time to read it. You really aren't discussing in good faith here.