3 ms·

Aren't you basically just describing a more complex, weaker form of RSA SecurID hard tokens or Authenticator-app soft tokens? With a centralized API for validat

Aren't you basically just describing a more complex, weaker form of RSA SecurID hard tokens or Authenticator-app soft tokens? With a centralized API for validating a generated key vs identification details? EDIT: Thinking about this more, it seems like a much harder problem than this quipped solution gives credit for. The agency wishing to validate a generated key would need to have enough identifying information to isolate a single row in the centralized database to validate the token. Because we don't want every token assigned to John Smith to validate every John Smith. So now this centralized database needs to have something that's unique to every single row... Or, in other words, the same problem as SSNs have to start with.

Someone1234 8y ago
No, and the fact you think it is anything like SecureID means I did a poor job explaining it. It replaces cardboard cards with a SSN on them, with a cardboard card with a longer randomly generated key on it. There's no electronics involved from the consumer's perspective at all. The key is provided on your e.g. loan application. The financial institution sends that key to the government via API, and receives back a Unique ID assigned to you as an individual that never changes. The financial institution should then dispose of the key you provided them. The Unique ID is essentially used like an SSN; but the major differences are: - The consumer never provides it directly - The consumer's version of it (key) can be rotated freely - If the Unique ID itself leaks it has no value, since the API Cycle (i.e. Key -> Unique ID) is part of the system that financial institutions would use, supplying the Unique ID would just throw an error (since it isn't a valid key). So it completely different from SecurID, and is more akin to SSNs with most of the core issues resolved. Issuing cardboard cards with numbers on them isn't inherently complex, and is what we're already doing. The most challenging part is getting financial institutions to implement the API calls and update application forms. You'd also have to remain vigilant that they aren't storing the Keys themselves longer than absolutely necessary.
- jdmichal 8y ago
  I'm with you, except for the part where we trust the middle man to please-pretty-please-pinky-swear delete the key. That, to me, makes it weaker than a token approach. With the token approach, the intermediate value has such a short useful lifetime that it's practically not a secret. The real secret -- the value required to duplicate the token -- remains with only the client and the centralized store.
  - Someone1234 8y ago
    > please-pretty-please-pinky-swear delete the key. In the first post I said quite the opposite: > Make it illegal to store the numeric key itself in a database for long periods. Using actual electronic tokens is impractical due to the costs. Even assuming just $1/each we're talking conservatively almost half a billion dollars (inc. shipping), and the upkeep would be similarly high. The proposal above 1:1 replaces the system we have and are already paying for while solving most of the major weaknesses. Multiple smartcard-like systems have failed spectacularly in other countries, a SecurID-like token would suffer from many of the same issues.
    - jdmichal 8y ago
      In the end, you're really stuck between two places. Either you have something static, in which case it's got all the negatives of a static secret. Or, you have something dynamic, in which case you have to manage the infrastructure. The only thing that makes SSNs bad static secrets is that you should basically assume yours has been leaked at this point. Like others have said in this thread, they're not bad identifiers, but they're a terrible choice for confirming identity. Your system is just another static piece of data to keep secret. Which is where SSNs started when this crazy train kicked off. And no, "rotation" is not the secret sauce, because SSNs can already be rotated under certain circumstances. I also don't understand how the "unique ID" doesn't have value. OK, you can't confirm an identity with it on the centralized system. But as far as I can tell, it basically serves as proof that you did confirm the identity. There's no way to distinguish between "obtained unique ID via the key and thereby proved identity" and "obtained unique ID via any other method and thereby did not prove identity".

Someone1234 8y ago

No, and the fact you think it is anything like SecureID means I did a poor job explaining it. It replaces cardboard cards with a SSN on them, with a cardboard card with a longer randomly generated key on it. There's no electronics involved from the consumer's perspective at all. The key is provided on your e.g. loan application. The financial institution sends that key to the government via API, and receives back a Unique ID assigned to you as an individual that never changes. The financial institution should then dispose of the key you provided them. The Unique ID is essentially used like an SSN; but the major differences are: - The consumer never provides it directly - The consumer's version of it (key) can be rotated freely - If the Unique ID itself leaks it has no value, since the API Cycle (i.e. Key -> Unique ID) is part of the system that financial institutions would use, supplying the Unique ID would just throw an error (since it isn't a valid key). So it completely different from SecurID, and is more akin to SSNs with most of the core issues resolved. Issuing cardboard cards with numbers on them isn't inherently complex, and is what we're already doing. The most challenging part is getting financial institutions to implement the API calls and update application forms. You'd also have to remain vigilant that they aren't storing the Keys themselves longer than absolutely necessary.

jdmichal 8y ago
I'm with you, except for the part where we trust the middle man to please-pretty-please-pinky-swear delete the key. That, to me, makes it weaker than a token approach. With the token approach, the intermediate value has such a short useful lifetime that it's practically not a secret. The real secret -- the value required to duplicate the token -- remains with only the client and the centralized store.
- Someone1234 8y ago
  > please-pretty-please-pinky-swear delete the key. In the first post I said quite the opposite: > Make it illegal to store the numeric key itself in a database for long periods. Using actual electronic tokens is impractical due to the costs. Even assuming just $1/each we're talking conservatively almost half a billion dollars (inc. shipping), and the upkeep would be similarly high. The proposal above 1:1 replaces the system we have and are already paying for while solving most of the major weaknesses. Multiple smartcard-like systems have failed spectacularly in other countries, a SecurID-like token would suffer from many of the same issues.
  - jdmichal 8y ago
    In the end, you're really stuck between two places. Either you have something static, in which case it's got all the negatives of a static secret. Or, you have something dynamic, in which case you have to manage the infrastructure. The only thing that makes SSNs bad static secrets is that you should basically assume yours has been leaked at this point. Like others have said in this thread, they're not bad identifiers, but they're a terrible choice for confirming identity. Your system is just another static piece of data to keep secret. Which is where SSNs started when this crazy train kicked off. And no, "rotation" is not the secret sauce, because SSNs can already be rotated under certain circumstances. I also don't understand how the "unique ID" doesn't have value. OK, you can't confirm an identity with it on the centralized system. But as far as I can tell, it basically serves as proof that you did confirm the identity. There's no way to distinguish between "obtained unique ID via the key and thereby proved identity" and "obtained unique ID via any other method and thereby did not prove identity".