From the paper: https://arxiv.org/pdf/1903.00446.pdf https://arxiv.org/pdf/1903.00446.pdf 1.1 Our Contribution We have discovered a novel microarchitectural l

From the paper: https://arxiv.org/pdf/1903.00446.pdf https://arxiv.org/pdf/1903.00446.pdf 1.1 Our Contribution We have discovered a novel microarchitectural leakage which reveals critical information about physical page mappings to user space processes. The leakage can be exploited by a limited set of instructions, which is visible in all Intel genera- tions starting from the 1st generation of Intel Core processors, independent of the OS and also works from within virtual ma- chines and sandboxed environments. In summary, this work: 1. exposes a previously unknown microarchitectural leak- age stemming from the false dependency hazards during speculative load operations. 2. proposes an attack, SPOILER, to efficiently exploit this leakage to speed up the reverse engineering of virtual-to- physical mappings by a factor of 256 from both native and JavaScript environments. 3. demonstrates a novel eviction set search technique from JavaScript and compares its reliability and efficiency to existing approaches. 4. achieves efficient DRAM row conflicts and the first double-sided Rowhammer attack with normal user-level privilege using the contiguous memory detection capa- bility of SPOILER. 5. explores how SPOILER can track nearby load operations from a more privileged security domain right after a context switch.