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The main thing this thread (going with steventhedev's link) demonstrates to me is that the CA program is completely broken. Here we have a potential CA that is
by gpm 8y ago
The main thing this thread (going with steventhedev's link) demonstrates to me is that the CA program is completely broken. Here we have a potential CA that is
- Demonstrably involved in internet surveillance [0]
- Doesn't understand the word "entropy" [1] or intentionally interprets the guidelines in an obtuse manner in which the sequence 0, 1, 2, ... can be considered randomly generated with 64 bits of entropy [2].
- Likely in the business of lying [3] (either they are lying or reuters is thoroughly mistaken or lying)
How could whatever public benefit is gained by including these people as a CA possibly outweigh the risk? I'd think that any one of the above should disqualify them.
It also seems completely backwards that the root CAs publish certificates that give subCAs equivalent power while not having the subCAs go through the same level of scrutiny as root CAs.
[0] https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-spying-raven/ https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-spyi... - also whatever you think "defensive cyber security" means.
[1] This is after repeated prompting and consulting with engineers (hint for those not familiar with entropy, it's not possible to have more than x bits of entropy in a x bit random number, and they are using a 63 bit number) https://groups.google.com/forum/#!msg/mozilla.dev.security.policy/nnLVNfqgz7g/_OPSSs2uAAAJ https://groups.google.com/forum/#!msg/mozilla.dev.security.p...
[2] Kindly pointed out by Matt Palmer: https://groups.google.com/d/msg/mozilla.dev.security.policy/nnLVNfqgz7g/c6HoK97RBQAJ https://groups.google.com/d/msg/mozilla.dev.security.policy/...
[3] Compare mentions of dark matters in the first link, to there statement in the second link (one assumes that any reasonable definition of defensive does not involve spying on people in other nations)
- https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-spying-raven/ https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-spyi...
- https://groups.google.com/d/msg/mozilla.dev.security.policy/nnLVNfqgz7g/C2A-t0xMBQAJ https://groups.google.com/d/msg/mozilla.dev.security.policy/...
- gruez 8y ago>It also seems completely backwards that the root CAs publish certificates that give subCAs equivalent power while not having the subCAs go through the same level of scrutiny as root CAs. AFAIK the logic is that the since root CA is fronting the risk (in case of any misissuance), there doesn't need to be any extra scrutiny on the part of browser vendors. Besides, if this was somehow outlawed, then the root CA will simply provide a API that rubber-stamps whatever certificate is requested.
- gpm 8y ago> AFAIK the logic is that the since root CA is fronting the risk (in case of any misissuance), there doesn't need to be any extra scrutiny on the part of browser vendors. This logic doesn't make sense (though I think it is the logic) - We audit CAs precisely because the cost of being caught isn't high enough to provide a reasonable deterance. - No one is suggesting removing digicerts root certs over this. The cost to the public is too high. > the root CA will simply provide a API that rubber-stamps whatever certificate is requested. - We audit CAs precisely to prevent them from doing things like this... Any CA caught doing this after it was forbidden isn't worth anyones trust and could be immediately removed. - Even that would be an improvement because they would presumably keep logs...