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The fact that a reason is used (and has been used) to justify censorship unjustly does not mean that the reason itself is invalid, or that there is no such thin

The fact that a reason is used (and has been used) to justify censorship unjustly does not mean that the reason itself is invalid, or that there is no such thing as good censorship; most people agree that some censorship (of threats or child pornography etc.) can be a great positive force. There is no reason behind the idea that because we can't totally differentiate between good and bad where the line is blurry then we can't do anything at all. I'd also question whether free speech is intrinsically valuable, more than other actions are. I have seen no convincing reason to think so. We can approve of good actions (like putting a Wikipedia link about earth science under a flat earther's video) and disapprove of bad ones (like putting flat earth propaganda underneath a scientific video). I see no issue here.

hackinthebochs 8y ago
The debate isn't whether we can do any sort of "good" censoring, but whether we should do any censoring at all. (Just to be clear, I'm narrowing the scope under discussion to ideas. Of course things like child pornography should be censored due to the direct harm.) I reject the idea that society should welcome some authority having control over ideas such that ones deemed "bad" enough by a large enough majority should be actively suppressed. The "good" we presume can be done by shielding people from bad ideas does not outweigh the fundamental right of expression and communication.
- claudiawerner 8y ago
  Your claim is that some form of censorship may be permissible if the harm is direct, but I think this carries with it a certain ideological slant - what harm is 'direct' and 'indirect' has vastly different consequences; for instance, prevention of direct harm may be sufficient to protect children, but it probably isn't enough to protect the proliferation of racist or sexist ideas which have historically led to widespread oppression on those fronts. What is your threshold for harm? Here we see the vacuity of the harm principle: one can claim anything is (or isn't) harmful in order to attach their favorite idea to it. As an example, some people may be said to be harmed simply by the knowledge that someone is watching pornography in their house. You'd likely say that doesn't "count" as harm - well then what does? As it turns out, controlling speech under your schema is simply a matter of defining what counts as harm and what doesn't. Yet philosophers such as Joel Feinberg and Catherine MacKinnon have pointed out, very few people (if any) would like to live in a society in which only harmful speech (or acts, since there is no meaningful distinction between speech and acts other than invoking body-mind dualism) is not permitted. Then we get to ideas: who's to say that threats or child porn can't carry ideas in them? In censoring them, aren't we censoring ideas too? Some would say the idea that "it's not so bad to have sex with children" is encoded in every instance of child pornography. What if I made my threat into an art piece?
  - hackinthebochs 8y ago
    Your argument is unmoving. Child pornography isn't speech nor it is an idea. Images are records of events and the dissemination of such records can be directly harmful. There is no ambiguity about the harm principle to be mined from this example. > In censoring them, aren't we censoring ideas too? Ideas are by definition abstract and so they should be communicable through some other medium.
    - claudiawerner 8y ago
      You've managed to circumvent my entire post and you're still wrong; my point was that ideas are communicated through a medium, and they can even be communicated through, for instance, threats and pornography. You have given no convincing reason to single out child-pornographic images for censorship while allowing others, such as regular pornography. What differentiates the free speech content of child pornography from other pornography, or even art which required harm in its creation? Obviously I'm not defending child pornography here, but I think there's a logical flaw in your reasoning. The fact that ideas can be communicated through other media is irrelevant, since it would mean that we can censor whatever ideas we like in any major category (e.g ideas conveyed in photography and film) but thereby only farcically allow them otherwise (e.g the expression of the idea is only allowed through physical speech).
      - hackinthebochs 8y ago
        >and they can even be communicated through, for instance, threats and pornography. But censoring one particular medium is not censoring the idea. So your attempt at finding a contradiction doesn't hold water. >What differentiates the free speech content of child pornography from other pornography, or even art which required harm in its creation? Consent. >since it would mean that we can censor whatever ideas we like in any major category This doesn't follow from my argument that censoring one particular medium is OK. Child porn is a genuine special case (direct harm in its production, lack of consent in dissemination) that doesn't transfer to other mediums that don't have the same problems.

hackinthebochs 8y ago

The debate isn't whether we can do any sort of "good" censoring, but whether we should do any censoring at all. (Just to be clear, I'm narrowing the scope under discussion to ideas. Of course things like child pornography should be censored due to the direct harm.) I reject the idea that society should welcome some authority having control over ideas such that ones deemed "bad" enough by a large enough majority should be actively suppressed. The "good" we presume can be done by shielding people from bad ideas does not outweigh the fundamental right of expression and communication.

claudiawerner 8y ago
Your claim is that some form of censorship may be permissible if the harm is direct, but I think this carries with it a certain ideological slant - what harm is 'direct' and 'indirect' has vastly different consequences; for instance, prevention of direct harm may be sufficient to protect children, but it probably isn't enough to protect the proliferation of racist or sexist ideas which have historically led to widespread oppression on those fronts. What is your threshold for harm? Here we see the vacuity of the harm principle: one can claim anything is (or isn't) harmful in order to attach their favorite idea to it. As an example, some people may be said to be harmed simply by the knowledge that someone is watching pornography in their house. You'd likely say that doesn't "count" as harm - well then what does? As it turns out, controlling speech under your schema is simply a matter of defining what counts as harm and what doesn't. Yet philosophers such as Joel Feinberg and Catherine MacKinnon have pointed out, very few people (if any) would like to live in a society in which only harmful speech (or acts, since there is no meaningful distinction between speech and acts other than invoking body-mind dualism) is not permitted. Then we get to ideas: who's to say that threats or child porn can't carry ideas in them? In censoring them, aren't we censoring ideas too? Some would say the idea that "it's not so bad to have sex with children" is encoded in every instance of child pornography. What if I made my threat into an art piece?
- hackinthebochs 8y ago
  Your argument is unmoving. Child pornography isn't speech nor it is an idea. Images are records of events and the dissemination of such records can be directly harmful. There is no ambiguity about the harm principle to be mined from this example. > In censoring them, aren't we censoring ideas too? Ideas are by definition abstract and so they should be communicable through some other medium.
  - claudiawerner 8y ago
    You've managed to circumvent my entire post and you're still wrong; my point was that ideas are communicated through a medium, and they can even be communicated through, for instance, threats and pornography. You have given no convincing reason to single out child-pornographic images for censorship while allowing others, such as regular pornography. What differentiates the free speech content of child pornography from other pornography, or even art which required harm in its creation? Obviously I'm not defending child pornography here, but I think there's a logical flaw in your reasoning. The fact that ideas can be communicated through other media is irrelevant, since it would mean that we can censor whatever ideas we like in any major category (e.g ideas conveyed in photography and film) but thereby only farcically allow them otherwise (e.g the expression of the idea is only allowed through physical speech).
    - hackinthebochs 8y ago
      >and they can even be communicated through, for instance, threats and pornography. But censoring one particular medium is not censoring the idea. So your attempt at finding a contradiction doesn't hold water. >What differentiates the free speech content of child pornography from other pornography, or even art which required harm in its creation? Consent. >since it would mean that we can censor whatever ideas we like in any major category This doesn't follow from my argument that censoring one particular medium is OK. Child porn is a genuine special case (direct harm in its production, lack of consent in dissemination) that doesn't transfer to other mediums that don't have the same problems.