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Do you realise how silly this line of argument is? Why exactly should we (or Google for that matter) not recognise that there are differences in some actions? T

Do you realise how silly this line of argument is? Why exactly should we (or Google for that matter) not recognise that there are differences in some actions? That some things are good, and some things are bad? In what world do you conceive it to be the same to advertise flat earth theories as legitimate unless you are yourself a flat earther? This idea that because nobody has a monopoly on the truth then we can't make decision is utterly futile and silly; I have no idea where it originates, except perhaps in the darkest places where reason has utterly collapsed.

hackinthebochs 8y ago
Of course, every authority since the beginning of civilization has carried this mantle in justification for censorship of all sorts. Having Google decide what information can and can't be shared on their platform (read: utility) is a dangerous state of affairs. What new social movement, or recognition of a current injustice will be stifled due a status-quo bias that is codified by such top down control over the media? We can't know from where we currently stand, which is what makes such control dangerous.
- claudiawerner 8y ago
  The fact that a reason is used (and has been used) to justify censorship unjustly does not mean that the reason itself is invalid, or that there is no such thing as good censorship; most people agree that some censorship (of threats or child pornography etc.) can be a great positive force. There is no reason behind the idea that because we can't totally differentiate between good and bad where the line is blurry then we can't do anything at all. I'd also question whether free speech is intrinsically valuable, more than other actions are. I have seen no convincing reason to think so. We can approve of good actions (like putting a Wikipedia link about earth science under a flat earther's video) and disapprove of bad ones (like putting flat earth propaganda underneath a scientific video). I see no issue here.
  - hackinthebochs 8y ago
    The debate isn't whether we can do any sort of "good" censoring, but whether we should do any censoring at all. (Just to be clear, I'm narrowing the scope under discussion to ideas. Of course things like child pornography should be censored due to the direct harm.) I reject the idea that society should welcome some authority having control over ideas such that ones deemed "bad" enough by a large enough majority should be actively suppressed. The "good" we presume can be done by shielding people from bad ideas does not outweigh the fundamental right of expression and communication.
    - claudiawerner 8y ago
      Your claim is that some form of censorship may be permissible if the harm is direct, but I think this carries with it a certain ideological slant - what harm is 'direct' and 'indirect' has vastly different consequences; for instance, prevention of direct harm may be sufficient to protect children, but it probably isn't enough to protect the proliferation of racist or sexist ideas which have historically led to widespread oppression on those fronts. What is your threshold for harm? Here we see the vacuity of the harm principle: one can claim anything is (or isn't) harmful in order to attach their favorite idea to it. As an example, some people may be said to be harmed simply by the knowledge that someone is watching pornography in their house. You'd likely say that doesn't "count" as harm - well then what does? As it turns out, controlling speech under your schema is simply a matter of defining what counts as harm and what doesn't. Yet philosophers such as Joel Feinberg and Catherine MacKinnon have pointed out, very few people (if any) would like to live in a society in which only harmful speech (or acts, since there is no meaningful distinction between speech and acts other than invoking body-mind dualism) is not permitted. Then we get to ideas: who's to say that threats or child porn can't carry ideas in them? In censoring them, aren't we censoring ideas too? Some would say the idea that "it's not so bad to have sex with children" is encoded in every instance of child pornography. What if I made my threat into an art piece?
      - hackinthebochs 8y ago
        Your argument is unmoving. Child pornography isn't speech nor it is an idea. Images are records of events and the dissemination of such records can be directly harmful. There is no ambiguity about the harm principle to be mined from this example. > In censoring them, aren't we censoring ideas too? Ideas are by definition abstract and so they should be communicable through some other medium.
- anigbrowl 8y ago
  That's an argument for ignoring harms that take place in the present because it's possible to imagine worse ones in the future.
  - hackinthebochs 8y ago
    If addressing a current harm leads to worse harm in the future, then yes it is an argument against addressing the current harm. I see no reductio here if that was the intent.

hackinthebochs 8y ago

Of course, every authority since the beginning of civilization has carried this mantle in justification for censorship of all sorts. Having Google decide what information can and can't be shared on their platform (read: utility) is a dangerous state of affairs. What new social movement, or recognition of a current injustice will be stifled due a status-quo bias that is codified by such top down control over the media? We can't know from where we currently stand, which is what makes such control dangerous.

claudiawerner 8y ago
The fact that a reason is used (and has been used) to justify censorship unjustly does not mean that the reason itself is invalid, or that there is no such thing as good censorship; most people agree that some censorship (of threats or child pornography etc.) can be a great positive force. There is no reason behind the idea that because we can't totally differentiate between good and bad where the line is blurry then we can't do anything at all. I'd also question whether free speech is intrinsically valuable, more than other actions are. I have seen no convincing reason to think so. We can approve of good actions (like putting a Wikipedia link about earth science under a flat earther's video) and disapprove of bad ones (like putting flat earth propaganda underneath a scientific video). I see no issue here.
- hackinthebochs 8y ago
  The debate isn't whether we can do any sort of "good" censoring, but whether we should do any censoring at all. (Just to be clear, I'm narrowing the scope under discussion to ideas. Of course things like child pornography should be censored due to the direct harm.) I reject the idea that society should welcome some authority having control over ideas such that ones deemed "bad" enough by a large enough majority should be actively suppressed. The "good" we presume can be done by shielding people from bad ideas does not outweigh the fundamental right of expression and communication.
  - claudiawerner 8y ago
    Your claim is that some form of censorship may be permissible if the harm is direct, but I think this carries with it a certain ideological slant - what harm is 'direct' and 'indirect' has vastly different consequences; for instance, prevention of direct harm may be sufficient to protect children, but it probably isn't enough to protect the proliferation of racist or sexist ideas which have historically led to widespread oppression on those fronts. What is your threshold for harm? Here we see the vacuity of the harm principle: one can claim anything is (or isn't) harmful in order to attach their favorite idea to it. As an example, some people may be said to be harmed simply by the knowledge that someone is watching pornography in their house. You'd likely say that doesn't "count" as harm - well then what does? As it turns out, controlling speech under your schema is simply a matter of defining what counts as harm and what doesn't. Yet philosophers such as Joel Feinberg and Catherine MacKinnon have pointed out, very few people (if any) would like to live in a society in which only harmful speech (or acts, since there is no meaningful distinction between speech and acts other than invoking body-mind dualism) is not permitted. Then we get to ideas: who's to say that threats or child porn can't carry ideas in them? In censoring them, aren't we censoring ideas too? Some would say the idea that "it's not so bad to have sex with children" is encoded in every instance of child pornography. What if I made my threat into an art piece?
    - hackinthebochs 8y ago
      Your argument is unmoving. Child pornography isn't speech nor it is an idea. Images are records of events and the dissemination of such records can be directly harmful. There is no ambiguity about the harm principle to be mined from this example. > In censoring them, aren't we censoring ideas too? Ideas are by definition abstract and so they should be communicable through some other medium.
anigbrowl 8y ago
That's an argument for ignoring harms that take place in the present because it's possible to imagine worse ones in the future.
- hackinthebochs 8y ago
  If addressing a current harm leads to worse harm in the future, then yes it is an argument against addressing the current harm. I see no reductio here if that was the intent.