> Because its life depends on it. Seeing a berry and not distinguishing its colour could be fatal. Not at all. There is absolutely no reason that the behavior

> Because its life depends on it. Seeing a berry and not distinguishing its colour could be fatal. Not at all. There is absolutely no reason that the behavior of distinguishing berries should have any felt experience at all from a functional perspective. What we'd like to explain are the feelings themselves. A robot can distinguish berries without feeling a thing. > Again, because we have specific apparatus that computes perception representations and estimates future rewards related to our current situation and action, and because these representations are essential for life to continue. This is just sidestepping the actual question. This doesn't explain the nature of felt experience at all. The question is why these feelings exist at all. What about "computation" leads to the complex experience of falling in love or tasting chocolate? And why would it lead to the particular qualities that we actually experience, rather than some other qualities? Even if you believe that qualia exist to causally affect our behavior (a contentious and problematic view, given that we can't measure them), why those specific qualities and not some others that could produce the same behavior? There are so many deep mysteries here that you are simply handwaving by feigning understanding.