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> This would only require changes to servers, not clients, and would look just like the secure version of TLS 1.3. If a TLS 1.3 client will happily connect to
by kevin_thibedeau 8y ago
> This would only require changes to servers, not clients, and would look just like the secure version of TLS 1.3.
If a TLS 1.3 client will happily connect to an ETS server that isn't playing by the rules, doesn't that indicate a flaw in 1.3?
- tlb 8y agoEither client or server can break secrecy. Server compromise isn't a threat model the client can defend against. For example, the server could simply forward a copy of the whole communication in cleartext to someone, and the client can't know this. In this case, the server is using a predictable number instead of a random one for part of the protocol. Possibly a client could detect this by doing multiple transactions and seeing if a number gets reused, but that seems outside the scope of TLS.
- kevin_thibedeau 8y agoThe expectation is that the encrypted link is not decryptable by a third party. If that isn't always true in the face of an adversary then claims of forward secrecy for TLS 1.3 are false.
- zrm 8y ago> If a TLS 1.3 client will happily connect to an ETS server that isn't playing by the rules, doesn't that indicate a flaw in 1.3? There is a way to detect this. Record the last ephemeral public key that server used with you. If it uses the same one again, refuse to connect.