Given Yahoo's experience, yes. The guy in charge of security and data access had a backbone and a reputation, so when somebody wanted a backdoor they simply we

Given Yahoo's experience, yes. The guy in charge of security and data access had a backbone and a reputation, so when somebody wanted a backdoor they simply went around him and got other people to hide it. (Which, of course, meant that the experts didn't review it and the thing was insecure.) I don't think Mozilla is wrong to treat Aus staff as a possible source for government privacy intrusion, but by that standard they really ought to view US (et al) employees as risks too. Of course, the Yahoo compromise was allegedly approved by Marissa Meyer and corporate counsel. (Which suggests some ugly things about trusting behavior up the corporate ladder.) I guess that could mean Mozilla expects a US intrusion to show up at the executive level, while an Australian intrusion would be more likely to threaten random employees with legal consequences.