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>Requires two different kinds of matter (conscious and not) This is just smuggling in the conclusion. We observe conscious matter and non-conscious matter. The
by hackinthebochs 8y ago
>Requires two different kinds of matter (conscious and not)
This is just smuggling in the conclusion. We observe conscious matter and non-conscious matter. The simplest explanation (as in requires the fewest entities in our ontology) is that there is just one kind of matter and that physical processes that we already allow into our ontology for external reasons are sufficient to explain why some matter is conscious.
- CuriouslyC 8y agoIf you mean conscious as in "acts like a human" then sure. If you mean conscious as in "has an internal experience" then that doesn't follow at all.
- hackinthebochs 8y agoIt is an open question what exactly internal experience is. It is begging the question to say its obvious that physical processes cannot have internal experience. But if we have no information regarding whether physical processes can have internal experience, then it is reasonable to prefer physicalism on grounds of parsimony.