4 ms·

"But you’ve launched at 40F and it was fine, and then one day you had to launch at 35F and it was fine, and then on a particularly bad day you had to launch at

"But you’ve launched at 40F and it was fine, and then one day you had to launch at 35F and it was fine, and then on a particularly bad day you had to launch at 30F and you’re fine. So you normalize this deviance. You can launch down to 30F, if you really have to. But then one day you’ve missed a bunch of launch windows and it’s 28F and the overnight temperatures were 18F but you did a quick check of the designs and specs and you probably have enough safety margin to launch, so you say GO." Now contrast this with the wiki entry "NASA managers also disregarded warnings from engineers about the dangers of launching posed by the low temperatures of that morning, and failed to adequately report these technical concerns to their superiors."

mannykannot 8y ago
From what I recall of the inquiry's findings, that statement is a reasonable (if simplified) synopsis of the managers' (specifically, the managers being referred to in your wiki quote) reasons for dismissing the engineers' concerns. Here's another quote, from the beginning of the article: "... I think it’s too easy to think of it as just a random-chance disaster or just space/materials engineering problem that only has lessons relevant to that field. And that’s not really the most important lesson to learn from the Challenger disaster!" [my emphasis.]
- petermcneeley 8y ago
  Your not reading that line correctly. What that line is talking about the physical nature of the device which I agree is not the focus of the article. The article is talking about the human side of engineering. Now this is suppose to sound like an engineer "But then one day you’ve missed a bunch of launch windows and it’s 28F and the overnight temperatures were 18F but you did a quick check of the designs and specs and you probably have enough safety margin to launch, so you say GO." But in reality the engineers never said that. The managers made the call in opposition to engineering. If you want to have an example of when there is a Normalization of Deviance in engineering you need to have the engineers say actually say "GO" and for there to be a disaster. You cant have the managers "dismissing the engineers' concerns" and then turn around and suggest that engineering Normalized deviance. Thats simply the wrong lesson here.
  - mannykannot 8y ago
    "Now this is suppose [sic] to sound like an engineer..." You just made that up. No-one else is reading it that way, and for a good reason: it isn't written that way. Also (following on from what pjc50 wrote above), most (if not all) of the managers referred to in your wiki quote were also engineers - so, not only did the author not make the claim you made up, it could arguably be justified if he had done so.
    - petermcneeley 8y ago
      "check of the designs and specs and you probably have enough safety margin to launch" I hope to god this is an engineer (or scientist), otherwise you have non technical people making technical calls.
      - mannykannot 8y ago
        Read the second paragraph of the post you are replying to - and, while you are about it, maybe you could finally respond to detaro's point, above. Your criticism of the article fails on at least four grounds: 1) the managers in question were engineers, as is often the case in large, highly technical projects; 2) engineers can make mistakes, and did so here; 3) engineers can disagree (especially when some of them make a mistake), and did so here; 4) the article does not actually make the claim you say it does.
        petermcneeley 8y ago
        Thank you for all of your replies. The primary issue here is the choice of example (Challenger disaster) to explain "Normalization of Deviance". Its like if you were an SSE working on a product that had some big security issues. You tell your manager not to launch the product because there is a high risk of a very bad security violation. The manager under pressure to get it done decides to ignore your warnings and launch the product. There is a huge security violation just after the product launch and it causes a scene. Why reach for some pet theory (Normalization of Deviance) to explain this? This is just the ongoing tension between the desires of higher management and the reality that those on the ground know. I think the reason why I am so insistent on this is because I am worried about the wrong lesson being learned. Politics and Power play far more of a role than we like to admit. This hierarchical structure is also very good at deflecting and distributing blame. Is Normalization of Deviance just another excuse to explain the commonality of bad management?

mannykannot 8y ago

From what I recall of the inquiry's findings, that statement is a reasonable (if simplified) synopsis of the managers' (specifically, the managers being referred to in your wiki quote) reasons for dismissing the engineers' concerns. Here's another quote, from the beginning of the article: "... I think it’s too easy to think of it as just a random-chance disaster or just space/materials engineering problem that only has lessons relevant to that field. And that’s not really the most important lesson to learn from the Challenger disaster!" [my emphasis.]

petermcneeley 8y ago
Your not reading that line correctly. What that line is talking about the physical nature of the device which I agree is not the focus of the article. The article is talking about the human side of engineering. Now this is suppose to sound like an engineer "But then one day you’ve missed a bunch of launch windows and it’s 28F and the overnight temperatures were 18F but you did a quick check of the designs and specs and you probably have enough safety margin to launch, so you say GO." But in reality the engineers never said that. The managers made the call in opposition to engineering. If you want to have an example of when there is a Normalization of Deviance in engineering you need to have the engineers say actually say "GO" and for there to be a disaster. You cant have the managers "dismissing the engineers' concerns" and then turn around and suggest that engineering Normalized deviance. Thats simply the wrong lesson here.
- mannykannot 8y ago
  "Now this is suppose [sic] to sound like an engineer..." You just made that up. No-one else is reading it that way, and for a good reason: it isn't written that way. Also (following on from what pjc50 wrote above), most (if not all) of the managers referred to in your wiki quote were also engineers - so, not only did the author not make the claim you made up, it could arguably be justified if he had done so.
  - petermcneeley 8y ago
    "check of the designs and specs and you probably have enough safety margin to launch" I hope to god this is an engineer (or scientist), otherwise you have non technical people making technical calls.
    - mannykannot 8y ago
      Read the second paragraph of the post you are replying to - and, while you are about it, maybe you could finally respond to detaro's point, above. Your criticism of the article fails on at least four grounds: 1) the managers in question were engineers, as is often the case in large, highly technical projects; 2) engineers can make mistakes, and did so here; 3) engineers can disagree (especially when some of them make a mistake), and did so here; 4) the article does not actually make the claim you say it does.
      - petermcneeley 8y ago
        Thank you for all of your replies. The primary issue here is the choice of example (Challenger disaster) to explain "Normalization of Deviance". Its like if you were an SSE working on a product that had some big security issues. You tell your manager not to launch the product because there is a high risk of a very bad security violation. The manager under pressure to get it done decides to ignore your warnings and launch the product. There is a huge security violation just after the product launch and it causes a scene. Why reach for some pet theory (Normalization of Deviance) to explain this? This is just the ongoing tension between the desires of higher management and the reality that those on the ground know. I think the reason why I am so insistent on this is because I am worried about the wrong lesson being learned. Politics and Power play far more of a role than we like to admit. This hierarchical structure is also very good at deflecting and distributing blame. Is Normalization of Deviance just another excuse to explain the commonality of bad management?