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Do you have a concrete proposal that is both credibly deployable and better than DNSSEC? DNSSEC is awful in many ways, but it can be deployed incrementally, it
by amluto 8y ago
Do you have a concrete proposal that is both credibly deployable and better than DNSSEC?
DNSSEC is awful in many ways, but it can be deployed incrementally, it's already standardized, and a good chunk of the benefit can be had without changing normal clients at all. I think that "absolutely staggering enormous global expense" is an overstatement.
edit: A major benefit of DNSSEC is that the CA/B forum already requires that CAs use it to check CAA records.
- tptacek 8y agoI do have a concrete, credible, deployable proposal: do nothing. DNSSEC is a net negative. I don't care that it's "standardized". The IETF has standardized a lot of bad stuff. I care that the benefits, such as they are, don't outweigh the costs --- those of a global key escrow system embedded in the DNS, those of the mass deployment of 1990s cryptography, and those of an enormous and expensive disruption to both our networks and, ultimately, our software, much of which will need to be updated to account for the untenable failure mode DNSSEC exhibits today. Why do I care that CA/B forum requires DNSSEC (when it's enabled) for CAA records? Nobody uses DNSSEC. Is it your opinion that none of the largest tech companies or financial institutions in the US have good security teams? Or, if, like me, you generally think money buys talent and companies like Google and Facebook and Apple (and, for that matter, Bank of America and Citigroup) have pretty amazing security teams, riddle me this: why have none of them enabled DNSSEC? Are they just too stupid?
- Ajedi32 8y agoDoing nothing won't stop BGP attacks from breaking HTTPS. Widespread deployment of DNSSEC will.
- amluto 8y agoGoogle, Facebook, etc presumably have rather large and competent security teams, and they presumably do things like extensively monitoring CT logs and BGP. And Google's properties nonetheless get hijacked on a semi-regular basis by BGP attacks. (A very small amount of looking suggests that this happened last November.) I'm not aware of anyone using such a BGP attack to get a certificate for a site like YouTube, but I see nothing that prevents it. I don't actually know why Google doesn't enable DNSSEC on its own properties for this exact reason. They may be relying on the fact that any serious CA will have "google.com" and similar domains in a list of high-risk domains. (Heck, I can't easily personally monitor BGP for a website even if I wanted to.)
- tptacek 8y agoVirtually no company with a reputable security team uses DNSSEC. Not Google. Not Facebook. Not Stripe. Not Braintree. Not Salesforce.com. Not Microsoft. Not Cisco.com. Not IBM. Not Oracle. Not Amazon. Not Github. Not NASDAQ. Not Citigroup. Not Bank of America. Not Schwab. Not Goldman. Not JPMC. Not Boeing. Not Lockheed Martin. Each of these companies has a huge security team. Not one of them thinks DNSSEC is worth deploying. How do you explain that? Is virtually every infosec team in North America just wrong?