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ICANN Calls for DNSSEC for All Domains Following Domain Hijacking Attempts
- deleted 8y ago[deleted]
- mrmondo 8y agoMods: this is the direct link to the article at ICCAN: https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2019-02-22-en https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2019-02-22-en (Also the current third party link doesn’t seem to load (for me) ‘Resource Limit Exceeded’)
- ryanlol 8y agoNone of these domain hijacking attempts would’ve been prevented by DNSSEC, right? (Also kinda curious as to why pointing this out seems to be somewhat controversial? :)
- DKnoll 8y agoPretty sure you're right. The US-CERT advisory for this campaign implies the attackers were logging into the targets accounts at registrars or DNS providers directly. https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/current-activity/2019/01/10/DNS-Infrastructure-Hijacking-Campaign https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/current-activity/2019/01/10/DNS...
- r1ch 8y agoNot really. In theory the zone signing could be done as a separate process from zone updates, but I don't think any DNS provider implements this - they hold the keys, not you. The other attacks used compromised domain registrar accounts, where the attacker could just disable DNSSEC or switch the nameservers to whatever.
- bluejekyll 8y agoAs I understand the attacks being against the login admin accounts for managing the domain itself, no DNSSEC would not have prevented changing the records in the zone. In addition, if the DNS provider hosting that domain automatically resigned the zone for the hacked account, then the hosting company would even have resigned the zone, thus making valid DNSSEC entries anyway. What would be better is to require 2FA for all zone hosting companies.
- regecks 8y ago> What would be better is to require 2FA for all zone hosting companies. Even with this, many registrars and DNS hosts are too fast and loose with disabling 2FA when you call them up and tell them you lost your second factor. Alternatively, requesting changes over the phone without going through web authentication. My confidence in 2FA dipped quite a bit after going through the experience myself.
- entire-name 8y agoPerhaps so, given that for most DNS provider, the ability to modify DNS records automatically gives you the ability to sign those record. This shows the importance of having a dedicated system for signing information, completely separate (and potentially offline) from the deployment system.
- avip 8y agoThere's an astonishing amount of fishy downvoting across this entire thread. That's weird.
- dang 8y agoThis comment breaks at least two of the HN guidelines. Would you please review and follow them? https://news.ycombinator.com/newsguidelines.html https://news.ycombinator.com/newsguidelines.html If you think you're seeing abuse, please email us with links (hn@ycombinator.com). That's in the rules too.
- tynes 8y agoHandshake (handshake.org) provides an SPV Proof that the DNS records held in it's zone are authentic. This means if an attacker wanted to spoof records, they would have to: 1) Eclipse attack the client, meaning that the client is on a partitioned network with an alternative chain tip. This grows more expensive as the records were written further in the past or 2) Steal the top level domain owners private key and update the database
- SahAssar 8y agoWhat does this solve that a non-blockchain approach (for example the PKI approaches we already have) wouldn't?
- tynes 8y agoThe root of trust comes from the accumulated proof of work instead of an organization. This is interesting because self signed certificates can be trustworthy if they are signed with the private key of the Handshake top level domain holder. I believe it will open up the chain of trust for devs to innovate on and experiment with novel cryptography
- _eht 8y ago>The root of trust comes from the accumulated proof of work instead of an organization. This is the only reason I have had any interest in the HS project.
- tynes 8y agoIf you have any interest in participating in the community, please visit https://handshake.community https://handshake.community
- geofft 8y agoIf a major brand is bad at managing private keys and is in the middle of an ownership transition (speaking entirely hypothetically, of course), is there a chance that they'd just lose access to symantec.com permanently and have to pick a new brand, instead of having recourse to humans to say "Hey please get us our domain"? If there is no recourse, is this generally considered a desirable thing by domain customers? Is there a process for trademark dispute resolution? If not, is this generally considered a desirable thing by domain customers? If the answer is yes, who holds the override keys?
- avip 8y agoWhat are unsecured domain names in this context?
- godzillabrennus 8y agoThis is not a new problem. There was a somewhat high profile theft a few years back where the owner published how they recovered their domain: https://www.forbes.com/sites/theyec/2015/02/28/how-to-recover-from-a-domain-name-hijacking/ https://www.forbes.com/sites/theyec/2015/02/28/how-to-recove...
- move-on-by 8y agoAs much as I want DNSSEC to be a thing, it just doesn’t seem like it ever will. Checkout this name-and-shame site and you’ll see how hopeless it looks https://dnssec-name-and-shame.com https://dnssec-name-and-shame.com
- jaas 8y agoWhy do you want it to be a thing? Have you ever been exposed to an attack that would have been prevented by DNSSEC? I feel like most people who want DNSSEC just have very theoretical warm feelings about the idea of it. When they actually implement it it does nothing but consume time and energy while adding liability.
- amluto 8y agoA BGP attack against a CA to get a fraudulent cert issues. (As far as I know, no one has done this to me, but they could.)
- tptacek 8y agoHow does DNSSEC help you here? BGP attackers control IP addresses. They don't even need to touch the DNS to misissue a DV certificate.
- amluto 8y agoWith CAA records and a draft extension to CAA [0]. Letsencrypt already supports enough of it in staging. If you enable DNSSEC and set a CAA record like issue "letsencrypt.org; validationmethods=dns-01" Then, unless I’m missing something, you’re protected from BGP and other MITM attacks. (Well, you will be once this hits production.) And it’ll be considerably less annoying to work with once the “accounturi” constraint works. I would go so far as to say that not doing this for a high value site will be irresponsible once this CAA feature becomes stable. [0] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-acme-caa-06 https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-acme-caa-06
- jaas 8y agoDNSSEC doesn't help when the attacker controls your DNS control panel, just like DNSSEC doesn't help in almost every other practical attack scenario. Let's kill it off and focus on efforts that solve real problems. It's worse than pointless, the added complexity is a huge liability.
- kadendogthing 8y ago>Let's kill it off and focus on efforts that solve real problems Like what? It's pointless to distract from constructive proposals with no supporting material for what the problems are with the proposed solution, and then claim there are other things that need our attention and then not even pay lip service to them.
- ryanlol 8y agoDNSSEC is strictly not a constructive proposal.
- kadendogthing 8y agoOh okay.
- jcranmer 8y agoDNSSEC is quite famously a solution in search of a problem. It's pretty explicitly designed to secure the requests from the resolver to the nameservers, not from the actual end-users--and the number of actual attacks that would be prevented as a result are pretty damn minuscule.
- phicoh 8y agoDNSSEC works perfectly fine for securing requests from end-users. Of course you need to link your application with a DNSSEC-validating library. But that's just a small matter of code. Things become slightly more complicated when you have to deal with broken home routers. But that code exists as well.
- hannob 8y agoSo erh a bunch of accounts get hacked, likely due to password reuse, weak passwords or phishing. But hey, it's about DNS and security, so let's push the dead horse DNSSEC, which would've done nothing to prevent this, because... whatever.
- geofft 8y agoThis is nonsense, and possibly crossing the border from ignorant nonsense to malicious nonsense. DNSSEC ensures that received DNS records are signed by an entity authorized to publish changes to the domain. It does not ensure, in any way, that this entity is publishing the right changes. It protects you against man-in-the-middle attacks, but not "hijacking" as usually envisioned. The linked article https://krebsonsecurity.com/2019/02/a-deep-dive-on-the-recent-widespread-dns-hijacking-attacks/ https://krebsonsecurity.com/2019/02/a-deep-dive-on-the-recen... identifies multiple cases of registrars saying that someone broke into their web interface (either by determining valid account credentials, or finding a flaw in the web interface). DNSSEC is not designed to protect against these attacks. As that article points out, some of the victims did in fact have DNSSEC set up. As 'tptacek pointed out a few days ago, many .gov and .mil domains have DNSSEC and were nonetheless victims of DNS hijacking attacks. https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19180817 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19180817 The US government is correctly not insisting on additional rollout of DNSSEC. I myself have been a victim of DNS hijacking: in January 2013, someone hijacked mit.edu and (among other things) redirected the MX records to non-MIT servers. https://thetech.com/2013/01/23/hack-v132-n63 https://thetech.com/2013/01/23/hack-v132-n63 I lost email to my mit.edu address as a result, and if the attacker were interested in targeting me (or targeting MIT account holders in general) they could have triggered password resets by email, etc. They got in because they apparently knew the password for MIT's account at EDUCAUSE, domain registrar or guessed it on the first try. DNSSEC would not have prevented this. The attacker would have simply instructed EDUCAUSE to sign the records, or instructed EDUCAUSE to update the public key to one under the attacker's control. And, for bonus points, had they done so, they likely would have been able to lock out MIT of regaining control of the domain for longer than it actually took.
- agwa 8y ago> And, for bonus points, had they done so, they likely would have been able to lock out MIT of regaining control of the domain for longer than it actually took. How would DNSSEC have made it take longer?
- geofft 8y agoMaybe I'm confused about this detail of DNSSEC in which case I retract that claim - I thought it's possible to advertise a false key with a long TTL and use that to prevent people from accepting records from the true key, if they still have the false key cached. If it doesn't work that way (e.g. if all resolvers will update to new keys and accept signatures from them), great.
- gist 8y agoAlthough ICANN has dns sec implemented correctly on icann.org they don't have it done correctly on icann.com which redirects to icann.org Also most FAANG companies do not have dns sec implemented at all (or correction). There are various ways to check this but the easiest is to simply pull a whois.
- tptacek 8y agoNo FAANG company implements DNSSEC.
- basicplus2 8y agoWho benefits from forcing DNSSEC?
- StreamBright 8y agoDNSSEC used to be the biggest opportunity for amplification attacks. https://vimeo.com/18279777 https://vimeo.com/18279777
- throwawaymath 8y agoIf you mean this question in the cynical sense, then basically anyone who will be selling DNSSEC services to large enterprises benefits. And those services will probably be expensive.
- wav-part 8y agoOr who would lose from DNSSEC getting adopted ? CAs. This is a fight for cert revenue: CAs vs ICANN.
- firekvz 8y agoI just submitted a link for a recent DNS attack on .com and .ve ccTLD domains, any chances that this: > On 15 February 2019, in response to reports of attacks against key parts of the DNS infrastructure.. Is related to said attack ? heres the link for the dns attack by venezuelan gov https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19240685 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19240685 it's worth a read
- markwakeford 8y agoWhile AWS supports DNSSEC for domain registration they don't support it for DNS. While it does appear that most of these attacks would not have been prevented by DNSSEC isn't it about time AWS supported DNSSEC ?
- throwawaymath 8y agoIf these attacks wouldn't have been prevented by DNSSEC, why do you want AWS to support it?
- philip1209 8y agoWould wifi portals work in a world where DNSSEC was enforced?
- pas 8y agosure, they would just hijack the outgoing TCP port 80 connection when you try to open a non HSTS domain. (and of course it could try to a port 443 with a fake cert thing too.) also, there can be standardized portal lookup/discovery methods (this RFC has already expired, but it's likely that the effort will continue: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-pfister-capport-pvd-00 https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-pfister-capport-pvd-00 this seems to work with IPv6 only, as it builds on ICMPv6 Router Advertisement, but "provisioning domains" could simply be a DHCP data type too)
- phicoh 8y agoSee RFC 7710 for DHCP, DHCPv6 and RA options: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7710 https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7710
- ngcc_hk 8y agoDNSSEC use another chain of “ca”, not the root ca like those in browser. It is another complexity. Not sure it help in general and as said here not even dns hijicking. What is its point is still not sure.
- tptacek 8y agoWorse, those "additional CAs" are de facto and in many cases de jure controlled by world governments, many of whom (including my own) have demonstrated repeatedly their willingness to tamper with the DNS to achieve policy goals.
- sprash 8y agoApparently ICANN seems to be a rather corrupt organization: https://freebeacon.com/issues/internet-group-icann-boosted-member-transfer-u-s-tech-iran/ https://freebeacon.com/issues/internet-group-icann-boosted-m... What happened to namecoin?
- realusername 8y agoI would personally also prefer a solution like namecoin going forward, having one organisation centralising the whole name system is starting to show it's limits (that and the fact that DNS wasn't a great design from the start).
- hodo 8y agoNominet, the UK's domain registry, has a solution called "Domain Lock". Whilst predominantly offered to registrars it is also available directly to registrants for the equivalent of $120 per year. Assume a user has a domain name registered with their preferred registrar, e.g. Gandi, GoDaddy etc., then to change the DNS settings the user has to login to his Nominet portal (using mandatory 2SV) and unlock the DNS for up to 20 minutes (it can be manually re-locked earlier). The user then has to log into his registrar (preferably with 2SV set-up) and configure the relevant changes. The additional steps involved are sufficient to prevent almost all unauthorized DNS changes except DNS poisoning. Nominet say that their separate "DNSSEC signing service was withdrawn from service in January 2016 due to low uptake".
- tptacek 8y agoThe best part of this is that ICANN has misconfigured DNSSEC. https://twitter.com/__agwa/status/1099782458046705669 https://twitter.com/__agwa/status/1099782458046705669
- Abekkus 8y agoThe tweet you linked to is making false claims about dnssec. It doesn't "blow up the sizes of dns requests" If you aren't explicitly looking up dnssec signatures, a signed zone's responses will be the same length as an unsigned zone's responses. Also, dnssec for their real website, icann.org, is properly configured.
- agwa 8y ago> The tweet you linked to is making false claims about dnssec. It doesn't "blow up the sizes of dns requests" If you aren't explicitly looking up dnssec signatures, a signed zone's responses will be the same length as an unsigned zone's responses. Unbound 1.6.0, BIND 9.9.5, and Google Public DNS all set the DO bit in their queries even when there's no DS record in the parent zone, so the DSSEC records will indeed be included in responses. And that's not even addressing the amplification risk. > Also, dnssec for their real website, icann.org, is properly configured. Are you disputing that ICANN owns and operates icann.com?
- acdha 8y agoDoes anyone know the story behind this quote: > This particular type of attack, which targets the DNS, only works when DNSSEC is not in use. That doesn’t match any description I’ve seen of these attacks where the attacker had the same access to the management infrastructure as legitimate users. Is there some other incident being discussed or is this just fundamentally incorrect?
- Dahoon 8y agoICANN should call for the closure of ICANN if they really care about the health of the internet.
- nhumrich 8y agoMaybe this will get route53 to finally add DNSSEC
- badrabbit 8y agoEven if your account is compromised,do they store the DNSSEC private keys for your domain? That maybe the issue here,requiring domain owners to generate the signature on their local computers seems to be a solution. What am I missing here?
- wav-part 8y agoCall it DNSSEC or whatever, DNS needs more crypto. At present security of DNS rely on manual intervention, 2FA, "multi-perspective DNS lookups" and other rituals. That does not scale to 250M domains. Expect more hijacks until then.
- PunksATawnyFill 8y agoICANN't is a scam. What a bunch of do-nothing rip-off artists.
- acd 8y agoIt works if you require DNS sec on servers and clients. If you allow fall back to non dnssec it does not work.
- ietf-dane 8y agohttps://blog.aurynn.com/2015/12/16-contempt-culture https://blog.aurynn.com/2015/12/16-contempt-culture