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> they believed mathematics is an exploration of the axioms, but also that the axioms must be true in some deep philosophical sense That's a contradiction, and
by MaxBarraclough 8y ago
> they believed mathematics is an exploration of the axioms, but also that the axioms must be true in some deep philosophical sense
That's a contradiction, and it's easy enough to show it: a mathematician can research the consequences of the axiom of choice, and can research the consequences of its negation. It would be silly to deny that such research is legitimate mathematics.
Brouwer's statement strikes me as circular. Beyond that, it seems to me that the law of excluded middle, is patently false. I already gave a counterexample: the axiom of choice. Neither the axiom, nor its negation, has a derivable truth value to settle upon.
Ah, I see I'm behind the times [0]
As to Russell, he of course turned out to be wrong. I refer of course to Gödel. I'm not sure I see your point in mentioning him, or for that matter Brouwer - do explain.
> our axioms must be consistent with it
They don't. We hope that we have the mathematics to advance physics, but we needn't hope that all mathematics is applicable to physics.
It's perfectly legitimate for a mathematician to explore the consequences of denying the axiom of choice. (I already linked to such.) Such work would presumably never have application in physics, but it's still legitimate mathematics.
> How do you ensure that that is the case?
As you later allude to, that isn't a question of mathematics, it's a question of how and why mathematical discoveries map onto observable realities like physics and statistics. This is a completely legitimate line of question. The canonical article about how remarkable this is: Wigner's "The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences".
> such questions are not part of mathematics itself
Agreed.
[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Law_of_excluded_middle#In_mathematical_logic https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Law_of_excluded_middle#In_math...
- pron 8y agoIt's not a matter of legitimacy (which is a social construct) but of foundation. Russell, Brouwer and Hilbert believed that mathematics must be based on a solid philosophical foundation so that it leads to some "Truth." I am not saying this is the only way to think about the philosophy of mathematics -- in fact, my original comment said just the opposite -- but it was very much at the center of the mathematical world in the early decades of the 20th century, and is still a matter of debate among logicians. The philosophy of mathematics is a deep and complex subject. It does not seek to mathematically derive theorems from mathematical axioms, but to derive mathematical axioms from philosophical underpinnings -- whether they are physical reality, some Platonic reality, or even common sense. Logicians don't think the subject is silly at all, and if you're interested in learning more about it, the SEP link I provided above is a great place to start.
- MaxBarraclough 8y ago> it was very much at the center of the mathematical world in the early decades of the 20th century Ok, but those pre-Gödel mathematicians were profoundly mistaken about the nature of mathematics. To put it bluntly: they were wrong, so why should I care what they thought? > It does not seek to mathematically derive theorems from mathematical axioms, but to derive mathematical axioms from philosophical underpinnings I don't agree. If you don't add new axioms, then you are 'merely' deriving theorems. If you do add new axioms, fine, you're just adopting a new set of axioms to explore through derivation. If some set of axioms gives rise to interesting mathematical consequences, does that mean these axioms must have philosophical underpinnings? No. Does the 'validity' of the mathematics depend on the philosophical underpinnings of the axioms? No: it counts as mathematics either way. It would be pure silliness to dismiss non-Euclidean geometry on the grounds that Hey, you just made that up! Perhaps there's a gap somewhere in my account of things, but I'm not seeing one so far. > to derive mathematical axioms from philosophical underpinnings -- whether they are physical reality, some Platonic reality, or even common sense Which of these underpins non-Euclidean geometry? How about fields with no practical applications? How about, as I've mentioned several times, research into what happens when you deny the axiom of choice? They're all still valid fields of mathematics. The 'underpinnings' of the chosen axioms are of no consequence: it's valid mathematics either way. The miracle is that we're able to be so successful with fields like physics and statistics. Picking the right special sets of axioms, we've been able to derive huge amounts. > the SEP link I provided above is a great place to start Looks it - will read when I get a moment.
- pron 8y ago> Ok, but those pre-Gödel mathematicians were profoundly mistaken about the nature of mathematics. To put it bluntly: they were wrong, so why should I care what they thought? How do you know they were wrong? Has there been some breakthrough discovery in philosophy? And if they were, Gödel was wrongest of them all. He was the most extreme Platonist of them all. > If some set of axioms gives rise to interesting mathematical consequences, does that mean these axioms must have philosophical underpinnings? No. Does the 'validity' of the mathematics depend on the philosophical underpinnings of the axioms? No: it counts as mathematics either way. Again, the points you are raising have been discussed by logicians as part of the philosophy of mathematics. As usual, things are not as simple as you may think. > Perhaps there's a gap somewhere in my account of things, but I'm not seeing one so far. Perhaps that's because you've been thinking about this issue for a little bit, while logicians have been grappling with it for over a century. I may have confused you with the reference to physics. It is not the reason for the problem of foundation, but I used it as an example for a situation where something external to mathematics determines our choice of axioms. The Wikipedia entry is also a good overview, but as usual, contains a few (sometimes serious) inaccuracies: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_mathematics https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_mathematics