4 ms·
I wonder if password managers should consider running under a higher privileged account (eg administrator). This would prevent lower privileged processes (eg yo
by r1ch 8y ago
I wonder if password managers should consider running under a higher privileged account (eg administrator). This would prevent lower privileged processes (eg your typical drive-by malware) from being able to get a handle to read memory without also using a privilege escalation technique.
- gruez 8y agoIt's not foolproof because the malware could also hook your browser and sniff your passwords from there. It's better than nothing though (instead of getting all your passwords they only get whatever you've entered).
- briHass 8y agoThat's exactly how I have KeePass configured on Windows 10. I've set my keyfile (additional entropy for the encrypted password DB, combined with master password) access to only allow the Admin account. Then, I set keepass.exe to always run as Admin, which of course prompts the UAC whenever it is launched. This actually accomplishes a few things: * The keyfile is safe from processes launched using the standard user account (i.e. non-elevated). Malware accidentally launched by 'me' can't read it. * Keepass.exe is running in the admin process space, which protects its memory from processes running in non-elevated space. * Launching admin-space Keepass, and seeing the UAC prompt, Microsoft includes information about how the exe is signed -- which Keepass is -- that allows me to verify every time that I'm not launching a bogus keepass.exe. * The password database file is still in user-land, so it can be synced with standard cloud sync tools. It is worthless without the keyfile though, even if my master pass ever slipped.