3 ms·
Basically, what you are describing sounds somewhat nonsensical. When you encrypt and sign data to be transmitted to someone else, 4 keys are involved. You enc
by taeric 8y ago
Basically, what you are describing sounds somewhat nonsensical. When you encrypt and sign data to be transmitted to someone else, 4 keys are involved. You encrypt with the receivers public key so that they can decrypt using their private key. Then, you sign with your private so that they can verify it was you with your public.
For this to work, you had to have a way to securely transmit your public key to the receiver and their public key to you. That is what the web of trust facilitates.
If you are in complete control of all locations, then you don't need to do the counter signing. Just indicate what key did the encryption on the other side. When you get it, either you can successfully decrypt, or you cannot. That is, never transmit your private key.
Now, you could self sign, I suppose. Such that you transmit another key to sign against to the remote. But what does that accomplish? If your backup system is compromised, they will have both keys on the remote. The one to encrypt, and the one to sign.
The reason I mentioned private encryption before is there is no need for authentication of data you created. Specifically the key. If you are the only one that knows the pair, then just make sure to keep one side secured. If you are worried it will ever get compromised, just make a new one every time.
- afiori 8y agoThe system performing the backup and the system storing the backups can (and often should) be in different locations. What (I believe) klodolph is describing is that you can self-sign an encrypted backup and give it to an untrusted third party. When you later retrieve the backup you know that it had not been tampered by the untrusted third party. In this case you have direct access to all private keys involved, so no web of trust is needed. In this scenario you trust a key only if you have created it yourself.
- taeric 8y agoYou still don't need to sign in that case. Either it wasn't tampered with and still decrypts, or it was tempered with, and no longer decrypts. Edit: to elaborate. What is your threat model? If you are handing over encrypted data, when it is given back you are safe knowing it wasn't tampered. Either that, or the encryption scheme you used is broken. If you are handing unencrypted data to someone else to encrypt using your public key, then you could use their public key to validate that they encrypted it. But you are, by definition, trusting that they did the encryption like you wanted them to. Now, if you hand them a key to sign with and a key to encrypt with, you also have to give them the data to encrypt. In which case... why do you trust every link in the chain between you and them that it worked? The game is already over if they have your unencrypted data is in transit between you and someone else to start with.