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I feel like this is asking past the point. Without a web of trust, how are you securely signing? You can go with somewhat centralized trust, but that only get
by taeric 8y ago
I feel like this is asking past the point. Without a web of trust, how are you securely signing?
You can go with somewhat centralized trust, but that only gets you do far. Or, rather, that forces everyone to deal with that centralized source. Much like the web of trust.
- resoluteteeth 8y agoIf you own a domain and have a webserver running ssl you can distribute your public key in a secure manner. What situations are you encountering in 2019 where you really need a distributed web of trust?
- jakeogh 8y agoIt's almost like not needing to roll your own key distribution mechanism is a nice feature.
- zeveb 8y ago> If you own a domain and have a webserver running ssl you can distribute your public key in a secure manner. That means that I'd be trusting GUANG DONG CERTIFICATE AUTHORITY and every other CA not to issue a fraudulent certificate against my domain. I don't think that's very secure.
- yjftsjthsd-h 8y agoUse a domain that requires certificate transparency and you're basically set.
- jamieweb 8y agoUse a CAA policy in your DNS to lock down the CAs that can issue for your domain, and then monitor for issued certificates with the certificate transparency logs. In modern browsers, certificates are not trusted if they're not CT-logged, so it's impossible for a fraudulent one to exist without you knowing about it (unless it was issued before these requirements were put in place in ~April 2018, but once all of those have expired, it'll be a pretty solid system).
- bmn__ 8y agoThat still does not help against the GP's problem. The most practical – yet totally ridiculous – solution in 2019 is still: for each end user, for each browser, to delete all pre-trusted CAs, and reenable them one-by-one trust-on-first-use. In a few days to weeks, the user ends up with around six active CAs that are actually in use, instead of dozens inactive ones that are just a backdoor waiting to happen.
- taeric 8y agoYou are just using a different web of trust. Specifically the SSL Certificate Authorities.
- tedunangst 8y agoWhen your browser auto updates, how many key servers does it contact? How many cross signatures does it require before trusting a key?
- klodolph 8y ago> Without a web of trust, how are you securely signing? I can only think you're making a bunch of hidden assumptions about how trust works or why you would want to sign or encrypt data. Maybe you're thinking specifically about things like email, where web of trust might make more sense. Consider, for example, if I'm doing backups and I just want to encrypt them for my eyes only. How could a web of trust even possibly make sense in that scenario?
- taeric 8y agoIf you are just doing backups, why are you bothering signing something? I mean, yes. Pgp is a bad fit for that. So is tls.
- Boulth 8y agoMaybe to ensure that it was you that created the backup? It may be nice when restoring the backup.
- taeric 8y agoBut if you encrypted them, there is no reason to also sign them. Either you have the key to decrypt, thus you did it, or you don't, so you didn't. Signing is for verification of identity over potentially compromisable channels. Not securing controlled items.
- afiori 8y agoif you encrypted it with a public key then you also need a signature, I am not sure what the parent meant though.
- taeric 8y agoI'm not sure I follow. If you are decrypting with a key, either you trust it or you don't. It works or doesn't. That is, why use a public key scheme, for private encryption? It is literally made to establish identity with someone else. Not yourself. Even if you sign things for personal use, that is just to confirm nothing was tampered with. Which, if it was encrypted with a key, is already guaranteed. Otherwise it won't decrypt. Right?